Results 201-220 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: What's wrong with that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: I was just asking Mr. Browne-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: -----if there's an irony in the fact that he's-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Fitzgerald, in page 3 of your written opening statement, you say:[T]he size of deposits taken from individual customers however grew significantly from 2005 onwards [where] some 'institutional' clients had over €1 billion placed on overnight deposit with the Bank. This concentration level meant the deposits in the Bank became increasingly more volatile and, while every effort was...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, but essentially you could sum it up by saying you became quite dependent on large corporate-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: -----deposits, yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: And who did you discuss it with?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, and would the top management have been ... above your level, have been aware of this?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Were any plans, at any stage say from 2005 on, put in place to mitigate the impact?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, that was to try and spread the-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Right, I'll just move on because of time, Mr. Fitzgerald. On page 10 and 11 of your statement, you say:Merrill Lynch, BNP and Barclays Capital Markets were separately retained in 2007 to conduct a detailed due diligence of the Bank's balance sheet. The resulting findings highlighted, among other matters, the Banks high concentration to property and development lending, the thin nature of...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Each had a written report to the bank.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: And where did these reports go? Who ... were they discussed?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: You don't know if they were presented to the board.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: You would expect that they would, would you?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: They haven't ... those three reports, Chair, haven't appeared in our evidence book. I mean, it seems to me that they are very material. The resulting findings, according to Mr. Fitzgerald, are quite stark, you know, again highlighting the concentration to property and development lending, the thin nature of the funding and the need to raise more equity. So, could we, at this stage, for...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, thank you. Okay. On page 11 again, Mr. Fitzgerald, you say, and I quote:[T]he bank found it extremely difficult to reduce or stop lending as the crisis worsened. This in part was down to contractual commitments to borrowers and also the risk that, without further lending, some development projects would cease and result in significant immediate loan default. And then you say that in...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Can I ask you, Mr. Fitzgerald, then, just to ... did that situation arise largely from the methods of Anglo? Large loans, for example, for speculative land development and then to justify this you had to fund the developers who were speculating with a construction of some kind to go on it.