Results 19,261-19,280 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: And I'm sure you know, for example, €20 billion is more than twice what we spend every year as a country on our entire education system, for example?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes, and that's why you're here today.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure. Just can I take you to page 22 of your opening statement, paragraph 90, you say: It seems clear now that the regulation and supervision of the Irish Banking system and of Anglo and Irish Nationwide in particular, was inadequate and that the operations of those two banks, as the most aggressive lenders in the market undoubtedly affected the way other market participants conducted...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: Why do you feel the need to draw a distinction there between the manner in which Anglo and Nationwide were regulated and supervised and the manner in which AIB was regulated and supervised?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: Do you think that the regulation of your bank was any less inadequate than the regulation of those banks, if that's-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: And your reference there to both of those institutions -----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: Well it seems to draw a distinction.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: And your reference to both of those institutions as the most aggressive lenders in the market, undoubtedly affecting the way other market participants conducted their business, and you've told a number of anecdotes around the Anglo story and the how it, perhaps inadvertently, impacted on the way AIB conducted its business. But for ... I suppose for many people watching the proceedings, they...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure. Can I ask you Mr. Gleeson, when you state that it was your view then, and remains your view now, that AIB was solvent at the end of September 2008. What is your definition of solvency?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: And if your assets exceed the value of your liabilities -----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: You said earlier on that the real trouble was in 2009 in terms of the collapse in property values, but can I put it to you and your assertion that AIB was solvent at the end of September 2008, that less than three months later on 21 December 2008, the Government made an announcement that there would be a capital injection of €2 billion into AIB.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: Less than three months later.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: But why was that necessary if the bank was fully solvent?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure. You describe in detail how the risk function worked within the bank and you cite for example that the risk function had between 150 and 200 people at its peak perhaps -----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: ----- and you had a chief risk officer and so forth.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: And the audit committee had a very important role, and the top ten risks were presented to the board.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: Was the risk of excessive exposure to the property and development sector -----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: ----- regularly featuring in that regard?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)
Michael McGrath: Can I ask you, Mr. Gleeson, about the issue of interest being rolled up and that practice? Because I think some light was shed on that yesterday by NAMA that, for example, of the €74 billion of par value of loans they acquired, €9 billion of that was actually just interest being rolled up and that €9 billion more or less related to the €40 billion in the land and...