Results 18,281-18,300 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Thank you very much Chair. Mr. Roux, I would like to ask, you mentioned that the decision to take actions against large Irish banks rests with the ECB. Can I ask who recommends that action? Is it the supervisory teams of the Central Bank of Ireland or the supervisory teams from the ECB?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Okay. So there is no risk of an information gap between people who are working on the ECB side and people working on the national supervisory authority side in respect of individual banks?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Okay, and information is flowing freely between people based here and people based in Frankfurt.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: They are the one team.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Can I ask, Mr. Roux, do you support the position of Governor Patrick Honohan that the Department of Finance should seek to block payments of up to €270 million to the remaining junior bondholders in IBRC?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: It was on the Irish Independentyesterday.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Well, I would dispute that, Chair,-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: -----because the BRRD deals with resolution and bondholders and junior bondholders not being paid. This is the work-out of that in an Irish context, so I would argue it's directly relevant.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Well, I would like a more detailed answer to the one I asked. Do you agree with the Governor's position?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Finally, can I ask, Mr. Roux, you spoke a while ago about the new risks that are emerging? Can I ask if risks which you identified yourself, such as interest rate risks, the risks of IT systems in banks, for example, are they now greater risks for the banking system than concentration risks, such as lending too much to any one sector of the economy and, if so, what is the Central Bank doing...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Sorry, Chair, the positions that people held in the Central Bank are on the public record, and getting those in testimony is, in my view, perfectly in order.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: The positions people held at different dates and who reported to who is a public record.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Thank you very much, Chair. Mr. O'Connell, you're very welcome. Can I start by asking you about the crisis simulation exercise conducted by the Central Bank? You're familiar with that. Feedback from staff involved in the crisis simulation exercise cited suggests, for example, too much information, too many voices. Concerns were expressed by the Department of Finance regarding confusion...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Thank you. Given the parties comprising the domestic standing group, can you outline the possibility that there was a deficiency in the DSG operating model which may have resulted in the group's failure to identify early signs of the crisis? I know that's in light of the comment you said there that by 2007 the goose was cooked, as such.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: Mr. O'Connell, you've used a lot of strong language today, as regards the views that you held during the years leading up to the crisis. Things were going bananas you said, that was obvious from the data, that you told your superiors things were going crazy, the banks had to be reigned in, that a crash was inevitable, since 2004 there was mad lending, overvalued assets. So, can I interpret...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: And, in light of the impact of asset values on the balance sheets of the banks, and you say that you foresaw there would be a crash in asset values, then around the time of the bank guarantee, in the autumn of 2008, you must have in ... as a logical extension, did you foresee the impact on the balance sheets of the banks and the capital base of guaranteeing all the liabilities of the banks...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: You asserted that asset values were dramatically over-priced.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: So then, clearly you would have realised the impact on the balance sheets of the banks, of a collapse in asset values which you predicted, and by extension the impact that would have on their capital and when the State stepped into guarantee the banks then ... did you predict it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Michael McGrath: At that time, or even in the period preceding that, did you bring to the attention of anyone more senior than you, the direct link, as you saw it, between assets which were overvalued and the impact of the inevitable crash, as you saw it, that would have on the balance sheets of the banks and therefore would blow a huge hole in their capital base, which was going to result in the collapse of...