Results 18,181-18,200 of 26,053 for speaker:Kieran O'Donnell
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Did he contact you on foot of your appearance before the inquiry?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Did he believe it was an inaccurate portrayal of his position?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: You said as well: "My understanding of Mr. Doyle's perceptions of the state of Anglo in September 2008 is based on other previous conversations". When did those conversations take place? What was the content of them?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Let us go back to the transcripts. On at least four or five occasions the Governor makes specific reference to having spoken to David Doyle. In questioning by Senator O'Keeffe he said, "I asked the person involved-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: It is on page 148 of the transcript. This refers back to the memo of 25 September 2008, which was completed by Mr. Kevin Cardiff and specifically revolves around the statement: "D Doyle noted that Government would need a good idea of the potential loss exposures within Anglo and INBS - on some assumptions INBS could be 2bn after capital and Anglo could be 81/2." In response your response to...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: I am coming at the question. When you finished up with Deputy Doherty, you stated: This minute came to light quite late in the process, but I think I probably spoke to people. We can check with Kevin Cardiff, who was the author of the minute and from whom I would have understood that he too had not really adverted to this. He felt that nobody thought there was a loss. It is worth further...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Did you not consider it? Have you spoken to Mr. Cardiff about this memo? When?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: No, I have a job to do.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: In your most recent discussions with Mr. Doyle what did he confirm about his view on the memo?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Sorry. I withdraw that.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Let us go back to the substantive issue of the memo of the 25th, which made reference to potential losses in INBS of €2 billion after capital and potential losses in Anglo Irish Bank of €8.5 billion. Professor, in your professional capacity, if a bank's core tier 1 capital is wiped out, does it indicate a solvency problem?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: The Merrill Lynch report was e-mailed to Kevin Cardiff on the 29th, the night of the guarantee, at approximately 6.45 p.m. It also stated that Irish Nationwide Building Society, in a worst-case scenario, would have €1.8 billion of a write-off.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Irish Nationwide Building Society had only a core tier 1 capital of €1.4 billion with a write-off of €1.8 billion. It would have completely eliminated it. Anglo Irish Bank had only €7.1 billion of core tier 1 capital, with a potential write-off of €7.5 billion. That is almost identical to what is in the memorandum of 25 September that was completed by Mr. Kevin...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Surely-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: In Professor Honohan's professional opinion, is it a fair observation that if one received a report stating that a scenario could arise whereby all one's core tier 1 capital would be wiped out, it was a clear indication of a major solvency problem in both Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society on the night of the guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Correct.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: In the limited time I have, Professor Honohan has not changed his mind from his previous appearance before the joint committee that in his view, based on the evidence that was available on the night of the guarantee, Anglo should have been let go.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Should Anglo have been nationalised on the night of the guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Does the Merrill Lynch report indicate that on that night, Anglo and Irish Nationwide were both insolvent?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Would it indicate that there were major solvency problems with both institutions?