Results 18,141-18,160 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: So should you not have had the broadest possible set of options available to the decision-makers, that if they had decided that they wanted to let Anglo and Nationwide go, that that could have been done in an orderly fashion, protecting depositors in so far as possible, burning bondholders and limiting the impact on the rest of the system? That option wasn't there.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: I think ... I think, Chairman, we're in the realm of speculation now as opposed to evidence and I'd like to stick to evidence.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: You said twice in your witness statement, Mr. Doyle, that Merrill Lynch, in their evidence ... or in their advice, stated it was "important to stress that at present, liquidity concerns aside, all of the Irish banks are profitable and well capitalised." That was their advice to Government, as such, at the end of September 2008, and you clearly placed some weight on it, because you've quoted...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: But do you now believe, Mr. Doyle, in truth, that those who had to make a decision on that night were in a position to base that decision on accurate and comprehensive information about the underlying health of the banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: We know what's in the public domain, Mr. Doyle.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: We know what's in the public domain. All of that is in the public domain.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: I'm asking you, do-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----you believe now that those making the decision had access to accurate and comprehensive information about the underlying health of the banks? We know what information they had. We know what they were told by the regulator. We know what the annual accounts for the banks told them.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Can I ask you about the inclusion of subordinated debt, Mr. Doyle, in the guarantee, and if you can outline the reason as to why it was included? You might comment whether the ECB had any view on that issue. And I believe you're familiar with the evidence, the witness statement from Mr. Kevin Cardiff, that that was circulated to you and he says in that witness statement,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: It's not mine; it's a copy that I was given by the Department.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Do you believe, Mr. Doyle, that the Central Bank and Financial Regulator had sufficient powers to take direct action against banks in the period 2003 to 2008? Do you think they had the powers?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Mr. Doyle, Morgan Kelly published an article on a potential house price bubble inThe Irish Timesat the end of 2006, as you know, and later published a report on the same theme as part of the ESRI bulletin in summer 2007. Can you recall if any discussions were held ... at senior management level in the Department afterwards on either of those? And were Mr. Kelly's concerns given serious...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you, Mr. Doyle. When Governor Honohan attended before this inquiry and he clarified some evidence subsequently in writing on the question of what should have been done with Anglo Irish Bank and Nationwide, he set out a hindsight scenario. And I want to put that to you ... and that hindsight scenario is on the basis that you now know the cost to the State of rescuing Anglo and...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes. Well, that's with the information available at the time. He is now saying that his recommendation would've been to nationalise and work it out that way-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----and ... but-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Finally, Chair and Mr. Doyle, when this committee had an engagement with Jean-Claude Trichet in Kilmainham, he was very explicit that in the lead up to the guarantee, there was no message to Brian Lenihan, there was no message to Ireland, there was no message to the Government that "You shall save your banks and that no bank shall fail." And can I just ... you have given your own statement...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Could you just answer the question?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Did this account that Mr. Cardiff has given, was that conveyed on the night of the guarantee to decision makers? Was any account given by him or Mr. Hurley of the position of the ECB or of any communication from the President of the ECB about the backdrop against which the decision was being made?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you. I think we have clarity on my first question.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes.