Results 18,121-18,140 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: As independent-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. But there was 9.2% increase in spending in 2003, so was it demographic issues that you had to have an actual ... that you would've needed €900 million more?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Can I ask you, Mr. Considine, do you accept now, in hindsight, that the extent of the dependents on cyclical taxes - such as corporation tax, stamp duty, capital gains tax - concealed an underlying vulnerability in the public finances which, when the property market collapsed, was exposed in a very significant way?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: If I can put it to you, Mr. Considine, an extract from Regling and Watson where they say "The IMF estimates now that in 2007, when the headline budget was approximately in balance [as was reported at the time], the underlying, structural deficit ... had deteriorated to 8¾ percent of potential GDP and amounted to 4 to 6 percent in the run-up to the crisis." So, while large budget...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: And do you accept it in hindsight?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: But it wasn't seen at the time-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----that this was a risk to the public finances?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay, but I would put to you, Mr. Considine, that the evidence shows very clearly that from the late 1980s onwards, there was a gradual increase in the dependence on the cyclical taxes, being corporation tax, stamp duty and capital gains tax. And during your years as Secretary General of the Department, there was a dramatic acceleration in the dependence on cyclical taxes to such an extent...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: You are disagreeing with the fundamental element of the reports that have been published by Nyberg, Regling and Watson, Honohan?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay, can I ... can I just clarify, Mr. Considine, the role of the advice from the Department of Finance in setting the actual quantum of expenditure? And if we take the example that you went into some detail on, 2006 ... in the February 2005 paper, the draft framework for developing the budget strategy memo '06 to '08, that basically set out an expenditure growth in 2006 of 6.6%. Then by...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thanks Chair. Mr. Doyle, you're very welcome. Can I just continue along the theme that the Chairperson opened up there. You have confirmed that draft legislation to nationalise a bank was prepared and similarly to issue a guarantee. Was there special resolution legislation prepared, which would have enabled the Government to take a bank into State custody, as such, to separate the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Can I-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Can I put it to you, Mr. Doyle, that as far back as January 2008, in a financial stability issues scoping paper, it looked at a number of different scenarios, including the scenario of an insolvent bank. It looked at the scenario of examinership for a bank, for example. And yet, are you telling me that at the end of September 2008, when the proverbial hit the fan, the Department did not...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: In February of 2008, in a paper "Overview of Financial Stability Resolution Issues", 8 February 2008, its on Vol. 1, page 71, of your own booklet, David Doyle booklet. Page 81 in that presentation says - this was February 2008, over six months before the guarantee - "As a matter of public policy, to protect the interests of taxpayers any requirement to provide open-ended/legally binding...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Had any steps been taken towards preparing resolution legislation prior to the end of September '08?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Nationalisation or a guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: So do you believe that the Department was as prepared as it could be at the end of September 2008 in putting before the decision-makers the options at their disposal to deal with the crisis?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: But you didn't know in advance ... you didn't know in advance-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----what the political decisions were going to be.