Results 1,781-1,800 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Could I ... AIB B2 on page 6, if we could have that one up please.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Vol. 1, thank you Chairman. As that's being sought, it refers to a board discussion, AIB's exposure to the broad property building construction sector, amounted to 260% of own funds, while the limit was 250%. And let me go on, the board requested that this issue be pursued with the IFSRA, given that the standards clearly required revision. Is that me saying I was speeding but the speed...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Now on B3, Vol. 1, page 17 and it's also Vol. 1 for our colleagues-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Yes, Vol. 1, Chairman. This deals with a proposal to revise the adjusted loan-deposit ratio. How did it get to the board? Did somebody propose it? Did somebody second it? Because it makes a 162% ratio into a 115% ratio. Was this also because we didn't like the regulator when we went over the limit? I mean, again, it seems to illustrate to me a casual attitude towards regulation. If...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Because our briefing notes were that it should have been at 120% and I appreciate what you said and thank you for the answer and so that when it went to 157%, we found a way to bring it back to 115% with many commentators suggesting that the ratio in excess of 120% to be less than ideal.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Now the fact that 56% discount had to be applied to AIB, only 5 points off, what does that mean about the conduct of the bank that it ended up as a silver medalist to Anglo in a competition nobody wanted to be in?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: This is the discount that NAMA applied to what was transferred over from AIB, 56% and Anglo was 61% and Bank of Ireland was 43%.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: I see the conference of management on 22 March 2007, the title was "Poised on the edge of greatness". I mean, was the board in no way anticipating what was just around the corner?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: That is the last one, Chairman, thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Glad to hear that. It is over your logo. Thank you very much. Thanks, Chairman.

Seanad: Public Services and Procurement (Social Value) Bill 2015: Second Stage (22 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: I welcome the Minister of State and thank him for his contribution. Unfortunately, I was dealing with the banks earlier today but I like what I heard from the Minister of State. I missed the earlier debate because I was down in the basement where I observed on the monitor that Senators were discussing important issues. I wish I had been here. A significant example of efficiency...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman, and welcome back to our visitors and thank you for your answers earlier. The picture that you both painted of Irish banking when you went in ... €2.5 billion you found borrowed with no collateral and you've recouped €5 billion which the banks weren't collecting. Are those numbers correct, for a start?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Now, in that picture, as we listen in in the inquiry ... one is that the management of banks themselves changed. They seemed to centralise all decisions and that the conservative old-style bank management based in towns around the country which, you know, didn't lose much money was replaced by one which was meant to be better, obviously, but do you think moving discretion and moving local...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: In the evidence this morning, the words "regulator was not aware" ... did we have the right system of regulation? Because you probably remember the controversy of whether it should be done in the Central Bank or some amalgam or an entirely separate body, as was recommended by the McDowell report.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: In Mr. McDonagh's evidence, he referred to IAS 39 becoming IFRS 9 in 2018. Is that about 15 years too late?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Did you have dialogue with the auditors of the banks when you were taking all this stuff on board?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: And you referred to, chairman, on page 11 "stimulating activity in the market". Is that dangerous? I mean, that's what happened the last time. When do we turn that off lest we precipitate another bubble, which some people fear?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Final question, because the time's running down, and thank you both again. Were we prepared for the euro, where wholesale deposits can flow in ... a banking system traditionally based on deposits and not wholesale lending, not knowing what to do with the extra money ... and, I mean, should we, as a nation ... worked out what would happen in the euro currency much better than we actually did?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Mr. McDonagh, do you want to add to that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Sean Barrett: Thank you very much, Chairman. On page 6 of the C4b document, we have the discounts and the average was 57%. A matter of concern, Chairman, would be that AIB at 56% is only 5% off Anglo and, you know, that compares adversely with Bank of Ireland, which at 43% is 18 points off Anglo. Does that have implications for this committee? Does AIB require substantial reform given...