Results 17,841-17,860 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Okay. So when you were handing over the Department of Finance to the new Minister, Brian Lenihan, in May 2008, how would you characterise the preparedness of the Department for the looming financial crisis, which had started but it certainly hadn't reached the severity that it was going to reach in the succeeding months?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: How prepared was the Department and in what state did you hand it over to Brian Lenihan?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Okay. And, the nature of the handover to Brian Lenihan - we have read the briefing papers he was given from the Department of Finance. Had you any other message for him, in taking on the reins in the Department, as to what you felt the key risks were at that time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: And, Mr. Cowen, in your witness statement which we got, and over the course of the proceedings today, so far, you have acknowledged some mistakes on public spending; that property tax relief should have been rescinded earlier; you've acknowledged the pro-cyclical nature of fiscal policy; the loss of competitiveness in the economy; not challenging the consensus of a soft landing enough; that...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Thank you, Chair. Mr. Cowen, would it be fair to say that in the pre-crisis years that there wasn't a full realisation of the interdependent relationship between construction, property, banks and the public finances? And I say that in the sense that when the banks got into liquidity problems initially, construction and property sector collapsed, led to a massive capital shortfall in the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: In the late 1990s, your predecessor, Minister McCreevy, reduced capital gains tax famously from 40% to 20% and it remained at 20% until late 2008. And when you look back now in view of the amount of land speculation that was going on in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, the investment properties, for example, the way in which all of that was feeding into house price growth, do you think that that's...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Just a couple of things I have to tidy up from earlier on in terms of the graph was put up a number of times of the June budget strategy memo, the red and the blue columns showing the actual budget outturn on social welfare and tax packages being significantly above the June memo levels. Can I ask in that context, Mr. Cowen, do you feel that you were sufficiently advised of the potential...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Just to clarify, when you got to your feet in the first week of December to present the budget - that June budget strategy memo - did that still represent the official advice from the Department, despite all the jockeying that had happened in between June and December? Was that still the most current advice, as such, from the Department as to how to frame the budget for the following year?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: And very finally, and again, we dealt with this earlier but just to clarify a point on the financial stability reports and any difference between the content of the report and the verbal message conveyed to you by the Governor in the meeting that you would have had, because some, you know, some possible discrepancy may have emerged in evidence and it's a line that we need to deal with. Was...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: You never felt you were getting a different impression from the meeting to the report that you had, presumably, read?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: You'd read the report-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: It was consistent with the report-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: -----is that what you are saying?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Okay, thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Thank you very much, Chair. You're very welcome, Ms Nolan. Can I start by asking you, from 1998 to 2003, you were principal officer dealing with the IFSC, as I understand it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Can you outline your responsibilities and duties in that role, please?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Sure, okay. You said in response to Deputy O'Donnell just a moment ago that the overall net cost of the banking crisis will effectively be the money put into Anglo Irish Bank. Can I just ask you your view on some of the work that was done in Project Atlas by PwC? I mean, for example, in February 2009, they produced a summary report of three previous reports that they had conducted into...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: -----decisions that Government were making and it was projecting-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: -----that Anglo would, even in the most stressed scenario, would have achieved the minimum capital requirement by September 2010 and the outturn was a €30 billion bill?