Results 17,801-17,820 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon, Mr. Cowen. You had an exchange with Deputy O'Donnell earlier on about the Indecon and Goodbody reports that you commissioned following the review you announced in your first budget in December '04 into property-based tax incentives. When you commissioned these reports, had the Department of Finance carried out their own assessment at that stage of the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Internal or external or from Revenue or ... not that you're aware of?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: So did you feel, in bringing your first budget, that you didn't have enough information on your desk to make a final decision on the future of those incentives if there was no assessment?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Chair, can I ask that core booklet, Department of Finance, Vol. 1, page 1 would be put up on screen. And this graph, Mr. Cowen, highlights the extraordinary growth in credit during your tenure as Minister for Finance and Peter Nyberg in his final report goes into this in some detail as well, that during the years in question, overall loans doubled from €200 billion to €400...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Mr. Cowen, when Brian Patterson appeared before this inquiry, he told the committee that there were concerns raised in a joint Central Back and Financial Regulator committee ... the financial stability committee, as I understand it, about the strength with which risks to the banking system should be identified in financial stability reports, in particular, as he put it, "As the clouds...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: And did you ever get a sense that the actual content of the published report had to be more benign than maybe the board collectively felt it should be because of the implications of putting some of those concerns in writing? And I'll just give you an extract from what Mr. Patterson said to this inquiry: As the pressure cooker developed more and more pressure inside it, the financial...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Now finally, Mr. Cowen, I'm not sure if you heard Mr. McCreevy's evidence yesterday when he was asked about budgets approaching elections. But I want to ask you about the approach to the 2007 general election and what impact pre-budget submissions and follow-up meetings with industry organisations and the imminent nature of an election, what that had in terms of impact on your approach to...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Thank you Chair, you are welcome back Mr. Cowen. From August 2007 there was turmoil in the financial markets. In September 2007, we had queues on the streets of Dublin as customers of Northern Rock sought to take out their money. Now, in November 2007, the domestic standing group was told, and it's on a document which is on your screen now Mr. Cowen, the domestic standing group was told of...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Can I ask that the next document would be put up, please, and this is the January 2008 paper, which is "Financial Stability Issues - Scoping Paper". And if you just look at the very top of that, Mr. Cowen, the purpose of the paper is set out, "to identify significant issues relating to the options available to the Irish authorities in the case of a systemic threat to financial stability, as...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: But the very purpose of this paper was relating to the options available to the authorities in the case of a systemic threat to financial stability. So it was very much on the table, that was the overall purpose of that document, was to look at the different scenarios around the issue of systemic threat; and it did look at banks becoming illiquid, an insolvent institution, the need for ELA,...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Mr. Cardiff said in his evidence that it was a failure not to do what I've suggested there, to have gone in at that stage and checked what you were getting into eventually. Do you accept that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Can I take you up an issue touched on before the break and that was the instruction to the NTMA to place deposits with the Irish banks in late 2007-early 2008, can you clarify what happened there?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: And how much money was lodged as a result in the different institutions?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: But is it the case that since the summer of 2007, the NTMA had started to move deposits out of the Irish banks because of growing market concern about the Irish banks, that there was some soft pressure placed on the NTMA from the Central Bank or the Department of Finance to put money into the Irish banks and the NTMA insisted on a letter of instruction from the Minister, a letter of comfort...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: And was that specific to Anglo or the other Irish banks as well?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: Okay. And the figures that have been reported are essentially that there was about €0.5 billion placed by the NTMA with the Irish banks in December 2007, €200 million each for Bank of Ireland and AIB, €50 million for Irish Life and Permanent, €40 million for EBS and Anglo. Do those figures mean anything to you?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: And was it just one letter of instruction or were there were subsequent ones?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: And can I ask you, Mr. Cowen, was it really appropriate to instruct the NTMA which after all was the independent guardian of the State's cash and who had come to a professional judgment that that money should not be placed in the Irish institutions? And you instructed them, as was your right, to place that money with the Irish banks. Was that appropriate?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: And did you question the underlying reasons as to why the NTMA had a reluctance in the first place to put their money in with the Irish banks?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)

Michael McGrath: On St. Patrick's Day 2008 following the collapse of American bank, Bear Stearns, the share price of Anglo Irish Bank dropped by some 15% in one day. Can I ask, Mr. Cowen, what was your reaction to that? What was the reaction within the Department of Finance and the Central Bank to that share collapse on that day?