Results 1,741-1,760 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Mr. Forde told us that the threshold submission to the group credit committee for loan approval was raised from €40 million in 2005 to €75 million in 2006. That's an 88% increase. Did that indicate that this ... we were getting out of touch with ... a property bubble ... to raise the threshold by 88%?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Could I draw attention, Chairman, to B1, Vol. 1, page 62? There's increase in exposure to a company from €789 million to €991 million where the large ... the group large exposure policy limit was €150 million. So the increase alone at one board meeting was greater than the limit and the eventual ... the new limit was six times what the original one...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes. The name is redacted. Do we know if this one went to NAMA?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: The decision to pay the dividend of €270 million on 26 September 2008 ... that seems incredible in retrospect.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Could I just return, finally, Chairman, to B5 on page 5? It's a question on which Deputy O'Donnell has raised but these references are a year later and a year closer to the crisis. The payment to the four executive directors was €6.4 million, of which yours was €2.1 million. Was there still no evidence that this was a banking model which was going to cost the taxpayers a lot...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: This is '07. The document is B5 and the page number is five. And the payments ... the total are Mr. Doherty, €1.663 million; Mr. Forde, €1.394 million; Mr. O'Donnell, €1.273 million; and Mr. Sheehy, €2.105 million. And the total, €6.435 million.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman and again welcome to our visitors. Was it ever discussed that you might go the ECB or consult Mr. Trichet in relation to these difficulties?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: And the crisis hadn't developed at that stage?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: But having broken the ice, so to speak, it didn't arise that you would, in the critical week, involve him?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Okay, thank you. On B3, Vol. 1, page 6, there's material from Mr. Treble who was looking at the loan-to-deposit ratio going up to 157% at the end of 2006, which would brought you second only to HBOS, and that is a more risky form of banking than relying on deposits and, in the same volume he said that targets were set not to go to 157% but to be less than 134% at the end of 2006. And the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Okay, thank you on that. Now, there was .... for Mr. Buckley ... this is the last one, thanks very much, Chairman. The organisation ... On page 4 of your speech, Mr. Buckley: "The organisational reshaping involved centralising as much as positive routine transactional and processing services out of branches, it involved creating a centralised mortgage processing and decision-making centre"....
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: B2, Vol. 1, page 8, if it comes up on your screen.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Maybe I got the lucky one .... yes, B2, Vol. 1, page 8-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Well he does say: '"This could lead to the bank missing-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: It's B2, Vol. 1.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Except that NAMA also found it a problem much later. Thank you very much. Thanks Chairman.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman, and you are very welcome. Just to explore with you the transition to "boring utility banking" as you call it, what loan-to-deposit ratio would you have in mind to illustrate success in that regard?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: And on the property concentration, I think that went to 390% when combined with development and the target was 250%, so again it's a ratio where AIB was out of line before the path to boring utility banking. So, what have you got in mind for that particular one?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Has the function of internal audit strengthened since you've come in? Because I see, in the 2006 report it says that when they examined the independent valuation they found that 13 of 25 cases tested were without valuations. One in particular, Glencairn Homes, was for €93 million. So have you tightened valuation procedures in line with what the internal auditor found?