Results 17,441-17,460 of 26,053 for speaker:Kieran O'Donnell
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: But you've signed off on the provisions.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: No, no I'm asking you ... surely with the valuation basis under IAS 39, that you look at the difference, you're looking at the future cash flows from loans. So it's not strictly correct to say you do not book losses until they're realised. The valuation method under IAS 39 is based on future cash flows that come in from the loans and to evaluate those, and I'm saying against the market of...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: It's still very low as a percentage of the overall.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: The question I'm really asking Mr. Fitzpatrick, am I correct in saying is the IAS 39 is not strictly about showing the loss when you realise or sell the asset? It's actually about looking at the future cash flows from a loan. And the point I'm making here is, on that basis, surely the provisioning should have been higher by the banks and, consequently, the audit report should have reflected...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: In hindsight, Mr. Fitzpatrick, looking back now, would you have done anything differently in terms of, particularly the audit of the '08 accounts?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Mr. Torpey, would you accept that the arrears that have arisen since the ... those 100% mortgages came in, have proven to be far higher than the arrears on mortgages issued prior to that date?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: But in your role in banking within the Department of Finance and the NTMA, you would have had access to that information.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Mr. Torpey, what's your current view on the appropriateness of the bank guarantee that was put in place on that fateful night in September 2008?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: My line of questioning, Chairman, revolves around ... that you were group financial director with Ulster Bank up to the end of '07, which is a relatively short period of time before the guarantee was put in place. So, it's more in terms of your perspective on the state of the banking system, the liquidity in the market, solvency in the market and did ... the actual ... the type of guarantee...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: How did the liquidity squeeze manifest itself in terms of the running of Ulster Bank, of which you were group finance director?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: When you say ... you might elaborate on that. What do you mean by certain planned transactions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And was it affecting your day to day business in terms of access to liquidity to do your day-to-day business as a bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: But was there issues for Ulster Bank Ireland itself? Did you ... were there times where you were not able to raise it through the normal interbank market in a normal way ... that you had to -----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Okay. Can I ask you one quick question, Mr. Torpey.? The issue you spoke about ... the accounting standards, if you had wished, could you have put a note to the financial statements as distinct from ... could you ... a provisioning, could you have put a note to the financial statements that you needed to provide a potential contingent liability in terms of reduction in the, we'll say, in...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And finally, Mr. Torpey, why did you leave Ulster Bank at the end of 2010?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Sorry, the end of 2007.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Mr. Gallagher, when you took over ... you joined Ulster Bank in 2005. And you ... the question, I suppose, I want to ask is that your role was ... you were brought in to head up business banking in Ulster Bank. Correct?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Okay, and very much, I suppose, to grow the loan book and it would appear as if there was significant growth in the loan book in '05, particularly around the Ballsbridge site, the Sean Dunne loan, which was well over €300 million. What type of measures would ye have had in place in terms of relationship management with loans of that size where you would have done proper due diligence?...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Around risk.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Typically, how long would that due diligence take?