Results 17,281-17,300 of 26,053 for speaker:Kieran O'Donnell
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: How does this relate to being-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: ---being the ... was it your largest fee, combined?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: How did you ensure that couldn't be-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Final question, Chairman, just one final question. How did you ensure that there wasn't conflict of interest where you had one client, Bank of Ireland, having ... commanding such a large level of fee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Thanks, Chairman. I want to welcome Mr. Smith and Mr. Fitzgerald.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Can you recall any issue, which may have warranted qualified report, which was discussed with the bank but did not feature in a management letter?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Did the adoption of IAS 39 mean that the audited financial statements no longer had to comply with true and fair standard, the previously ... that was previously accepted?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: If IAS 39 came into being from accounting years from 1 January 2005 onwards, if IAS ... which appears to, you know, by way of fair comment, have coincided with the massive growth in loans - development loans - in the banks. If IAS 39 had not been introduced, would there've been a difference in the way you reported and would there've been a difference in the way losses were reported in the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: But you would've provided expected losses, as well as incurred losses, under the old regime prior to ... IAS 39 purely restricted it to incurred losses, but you would've been ... effectively, as an auditor, you would've looked to have losses provided on an expected losses basis prior to IAS 39. Correct?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Did ye have an issue with the introduction of ISA 39 as an accountancy organisation? Did you make your views known to various bodies, your own institute and so forth? How did you feel about IAS 39 being introduced?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Can I go to EY - Vol. 1, page 31, which is basically your reporting requirements to the regulator in respect of 31 December 2008 accounts? And I want to reference this document back to your own internal memo, page 25 of the same document ... on page 27, paragraph 3. And you reference in it that - the paragraph I'm doing is paragraph 4 on page 31, "EBS internal reports indicate that it ha[s]...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And were ... were you ... did ... were you aware at any stage in the '06 and '07 audits that there was liquidity issues?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Okay. And what would have been your interaction with the Financial Regulator between '03 and '08? And how do you feel their role ... how did you feel their role, I suppose, was? And I can take it ... because KPMG were here before us and they confirmed that a meeting took place on 10 January 2008 with the Financial Regulator involving the big four-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: -----practices, including yourselves.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: So you might just give us a general overview of your general dealings with the regulator.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And in terms of what you quoted in your own internal report on going concern, page 27, and also your reference to the regulator, do you feel that it was in order to take the evidence or to take the assurance of the regulator in terms of that there wasn't an issue with solvency with the bank in terms of the breaches of the zero to eight days category?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: That was ... that was 31 December 2008.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And did you adjust their accounts ... the provision they made, that based on post-year audit, did you look for a higher impairment provision?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Well, I suppose, two things then might feed into that. Would you have carried out, independently, stress tests on the loans for EBS? And, secondly, what did you set the level of materiality ... which is obviously the benchmark at which you look at making adjustments ... if it's below a certain figure, an adjustment isn't required ... what was the level of materiality for the EBS audit and...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And can I ask ... you might just explain to people looking in how you ... because that means that you dropped it by not too far off €5 million. That's a significant drop of €7.3 to €2.7 million. Will you explain how that would operate in practice in terms of carrying out the audit and how it was dealt with loans?