Results 16,841-16,860 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: The point I am getting at is, like, from a bank's point of view, I could never understand the logic of a tracker mortgage because you were linking the price that you could, ultimately, charge the consumer to a lever that you had no control over. I mean, at the peak, what proportion of your funding, as a bank, was accounted for by ECB funding?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: I mean, a small percentage?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Percentage wise?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Between a quarter and a third.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. So, in the years prior to that, the proportion of your funding-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----from the ECB would have been lower?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Dramatically lower.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: You see, I could understand the logic of a tracker from a bank's point of view if the cost of funds from the ECB was the full measure of the bank's cost of funds but, of course, it wasn't; it was only a small proportion of your funding mix and yet you tied the price that you could ultimately charge the consumer to what was only a small proportion of your funding mix, which ... What was the logic?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes, outside linking. Linking your price to the consumer was a small element of your funding mix.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. We'll move on. Can you comment on the reasons why Permanent TSB had an exposure to Icelandic banks of €92.4 million and what was the total amount written off on these exposures, if you know? And, that is referenced in the core booklets as well. Vol. 1, page 79, there's a letter which I'm sure you've read from Peter Fitzpatrick to Mary Burke in October '08. What's the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: The full amount was lost, okay. In his statement to the committee Mr. Kevin Cardiff stated that ILP was set to run out of money by Thursday, 2 October 2008. You covered some of this earlier on. What was your assessment of your bank's liquidity and solvency position on the days leading up to the night of the guarantee and the night of the guarantee itself and, indeed, the subsequent days?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay, but did you need the guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Did the bank need the guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes. Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. I'll come back to the solvency issue but just sticking with liquidity for a moment, as far as you were concerned as group treasurer there was adequate liquidity on hand for the bank in the immediate days leading up to the end of September.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: This is post-Lehman's now.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: So, short-term funding has stopped.