Results 16,501-16,520 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: And do you think there was an element of engineering involved then, to arrive at the conclusion whereby Ireland ended up in that programme which the institutions desired?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay, but if I can move on to the issue of burden sharing which you’ve addressed in detail in your witness statement and in some of the questioning so far. In supporting burden sharing with senior bondholders, do you draw a distinction between the failed institutions which were being wound down, Anglo and Irish Nationwide, and the other institutions in your analysis and your support...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure. As you know in March 2011 the new Government did try again to impose losses on senior bondholders. You may not be aware of a paper from the National Treasury Management Agency at the end of March 2011 and they provided some indicative numbers whereby haircuts were proposed in respect of all the banks with total savings of over €9 billion on the remaining senior debt which was...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: So do you believe that, with the support of the ECB, Ireland could potentially have saved up to €8 billion through burning bondholders?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: But that would have been a very significant contribution?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: And then going back to the bailout negotiations themselves when the issue was discussed as well. We heard evidence from former Taoiseach, Mr. Cowen, and yesterday from the late Brian Lenihan’s adviser, Alan Ahearne, that in the final analysis it had become clear there would not be a programme if the Government had insisted on proceeding with burning bondholders in the absence of...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: There would not have been a programme?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay, thank you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you, Chairperson. And, Mr. Buti, you’re very welcome. Thank you for reappearing before the inquiry again. And can I start with your ... your closing remarks there where you acknowledged that some things could have been done better. So, in the context of the Irish crisis, what do you believe the European Commission could have done better?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: So you're talking there about the fiscal adjustment and how it was implemented but were they not matters for the Irish Government of the day to decide rather than the Commission or the troika ... the detailed elements of the programme and how to arrive at the target deficits? So, in terms of social protection expenditure and so forth, they weren’t matters for the Commission, surely.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: I'm just not sure I got anything there as to what the Commission could have done better in the Irish context. You went back to the fiscal element and social expenditure programmes and so forth but ... on the Commission, is there anything the commission could have done better in handling the Irish crisis?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: We'll continue with the questioning and we’ll see where it takes us.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Can I start by taking you back to November 2010? And you’ll be well aware of the letter from Jean Claude Trichet, the President of the ECB, to the late Brian Lenihan 19 November 2010, which made the continuation of emergency liquidity assistance for our banks contingent on the Government applying for a formal bailout programme. So was the European Commission aware at that time of the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: I suppose the question is: did the Commission support the direct linking of continued provision of ELA to the banks with Ireland entering a programme?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: That's fine. And at that time, in mid-November 2010, prior to formal negotiations getting under way - there had been preliminary discussions - had the European Commission come to a view that Ireland should enter a formal programme at that stage?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. In his evidence to the inquiry, Kevin Cardiff, the former Secretary General of the Department of Finance said: The big question in the public domain in relation to the bailout seems to be whether entering the EU-IMF programme was a free choice or were we pushed. Well, at the moment we entered it we were pushed quite hard [he said]. Have you any comment to make on that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Can I take you to the bailout itself and the interest rates attaching to the various elements of the bailout programme? The rate on the EFSM was 5.7% initially; the EFSF, 6.05%. Now, the IMF rate seems to have been quite rigid in that it has determined by set rules of that organisation. But can you explain how the EU elements of the funding for the bailout programme arrived at those...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: 290?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: 2.9%.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: You didn't want to create a financial incentive to get into a programme. You didn't want to reward a country that ended up in a programme.