Results 15,661-15,680 of 26,402 for speaker:David Cullinane

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: We took a decision to nationalise the banks when the banks were broke, essentially, or insolvent.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: A policy choice was made to nationalise what were broken banks.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Most were. Were those institutions public or private institutions? When they were nationalised, they were private organisations.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: How many other private organisations at that time were the subject of what Mr. Carville is calling stabilisation measures? How many private companies did not go to the wall because they were bailed out by the State, other than the banks?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: It was public money. Obviously, Mr. Carville would know about the banks because it is within his remit and the State would have had to bail them out. Other than the banks, is Mr. Carville aware of any other private institutions that were bailed out by the State and got taxpayers' money?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Of course not. Those companies went to the wall because that is what happens. They went to the wall and they were not bailed out by the State. People lost their jobs and people who invested in those companies lost. However, a different attitude was taken to the banks. It goes back to something Mr. Carville said earlier when asked the logic of this. He said he shuddered to think what...

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Half of it.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Was that a systemic bank? Was it a high street bank? Could we put it on par, for example, with Bank of Ireland or Allied Irish Banks? I am not sure if anyone in this room was a customer of Anglo Irish Bank. I certainly was not. It was seen pretty much as a developer's bank and an investor's bank, more than a high street bank for ordinary customers.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Therefore, when Mr. Carville said he shuddered to think what would have happened if we had not taken that decision, it might hold some logic for a fraction of the €66.8 billion that was spent but, for the majority, it would have made no difference. If Anglo had been left to go to the wall and the State did not take up the liabilities, I fail to see how that would have been problematic...

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: That is pretty much just paying the interest. The principal amount is only paid down when the State, for example, sells off the AIB shares and pays off the loan, but the amount we owe stays the same and interest is an annual interest fee that is paid for by the State. Is that correct?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Given that most of the money was for Anglo Irish Bank, we can now surmise that, of the €1.7 billion we now pay back on an annual basis - the figure may be higher or lower, but it is within that range-----

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: It was €1.7 billion last year.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Does Mr. Carville know how many homes could be built for €1 billion? Has the Department done the maths on that?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: The figure the Government uses is 5,000. That number of homes built on an annual basis would resolve the housing crisis. Five thousand homes could be built every year and yet we are spending this money on debt relating to private institutions that we had no legal obligation to bail out, certainly before the bank guarantee. We are talking about a housing crisis that could be sorted and not...

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: I am expressing a view. I am not expecting Mr. Carville to do so. As a citizen, Mr. Carville might have his own view. I am giving him my view, as a citizen. Can Mr. Dorgan tell me the difference between promissory notes and sovereign debt and bonds?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: When we had the promissory notes, that was essentially a promise that the State would burn the money periodically. Was it not that the Central Bank would literally burn money or take it out of circulation? In other words, it would take whatever the figure was at a given time out of circulation.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Technically, however, that was done by taking the money out of circulation. Is that not correct?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Mr. Dorgan might forward to the committee a more detailed note on this matter because it is important. My understanding of the promissory note was that the Central Bank was given permission to print €30 billion or whatever was the amount.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: The witnesses might forward a note to the committee on this matter. There is certainly a big difference between a promissory note and sovereign debt. That is for sure.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: And it had to be taken back out of circulation.