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Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: And that's for lending to people who want to become landlords?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Buy-to-lets etc., right?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Now, at a group risk policy committee on 22 November 2004, reference is made in that to the last discussion on residential investment lending ,which took place in April 2003, four concerns were outlined.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: The reference is BOI - Vol. 1, B2, page 63 to 67.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Sixty-three to 67.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. There were four key concerns I'm just extracting. Significant increase in rental property supply; falling rental yields due to increased capital values; residential investment property lendings are not self-financing except at low loan-to-value ratios; and then the book is mostly new because it expanded so fast. So, they are serious concerns that were outlined in April 2003.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Should the bank have seen warning signs and not continue to grow at such a fast level this sector?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: For amateurs?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, but, Mr. Goggin, you allowed 40% of amateur investors in that time interest-only loans. Was there not a serious risk in relation to that, by allowing a roll-up of the interest?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, but even so?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, would you ... would you-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Goggin-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. Are you aware of the evidence that Professor Bill Black, the US regulator, former financial prosecutor, gave to this committee?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Of Mr. Black, yes?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: And he outlined a recipe for banks which he alleges the recipe is: grow like crazy, make terrible quality loans resulting in record profits for a period, senior leadership made wealthy and then catastrophic losses. Do you recognise that in relation to the Bank of Ireland?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Well, your growth ... the growth of Bank of Ireland balance sheet in 2004, 2005 and 2006 was average of 20%. Loans of €9 billion was transferred to NAMA. Your profits double from 2004 to 2007, and you yourself earn €12 million in that time; is that not a justification, or is it, of what Professor Black says?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: If it stood the test of time, how did €9.9 billion bad loans result?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Joe Higgins: Can I ask you in relation to, just a second ... Yes, Professor Morgan Kelly in 2006 or 2007 could refer to about 30 studies of housing and property bubbles around the world, all of which, without exception, collapsed catastrophically. Why couldn't senior bankers be aware of this, which was well worked out in the previous 20 years, and know that what you were doing with the huge lending,...

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