Results 1,501-1,520 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: And then the difficulties, if I may refer to ... BOI - B1, page 17.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman. It should come up on the screen in time. Yes, at paragraph 126 there.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: You have the advantage, mine hasn't appeared yet, never mind. "BOI's issues have revolved around:-[1] the absolute quantum of property lending on its balance sheet; [2] the greater dependence on wholesale markets rather than deposit gathering; [3] the structural defects in financing of mortgage markets leading to greater reliance on securitisation; [4] ... [is] ... entering ... some...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: But were there not alarm bells in the bank that ... as you said in the introduction, that a bank which had been around since 1783 got into these difficulties against all its traditions of ... of conservative banking?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was the strategy a cause of the subsequent problems? And I have in mind what was perceived as the undermining of the local bank manager who knew his customers, who knew the society, and who had a strong record of solvency, being replaced by the next generation, which brought the bank to Government Buildings and needing a rescue, as you said.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: And, you know, did that perceived change lead to the problems later?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you. I might put one question to Mr. Crowley. And this is core document B2, pages 37-47, Mr. Crowley, and they'll come up in a while. This was a board decision to allow ... to move the earnings multiplier allowing customers to borrow up to 4.5 times their annual income and also to increase the loan-to-value threshold and was made in 2002. Why did the board do that, Mr. Crowley?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Then the next one, if I may, the same volume, pages 63-67, where it states that residential investment property, RIP, lending doubled within Bank of Ireland over 15 months from 2003 to September 2004, and over the next few years there was a relaxation of terms and conditions. Was the risk in doing that understood by the board at the time, given what we said about ... that the first reason...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: You ... residential investment property lending doubled in a 15-month period and property is, in the previous quotation, the first reason why Bank of Ireland got into trouble. So did the board understand the risk when it doubled residential investment property lending in such a short period?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Would there be nervousness ... as some of the expert witnesses have said here, if anything grows really quickly in banking by huge percentages - 100% in this case - in a short period, there should be alarm bells? It's a bad sign for a bank if it makes these explosive decisions.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Were you ever worried if an item grew by 100% in 15 months?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was there an option of a lower rate of increase than 100%, considering at that time-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Are the ... this is to both, are you aware of any loans or terms offered to borrowers which might be considered outside the normal commercial terms made during your tenure and-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Outside normal commercial terms.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: And Mr. Burrows?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Okay then. Now the ... Vol. 2, page 12, on page ... Vol. 2, sorry, page 67. In this one, when it appears, the regulator wrote drawing attention to the high level of exceptions to standard criteria, 24% exceptions in loans. How was that happening, and were there concerns about that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: It's a letter of 31 July, 2013 and I think it's on page 67 of that volume. Mine hasn't appeared so I can't be of help to you. Sorry about that, Mr. Crowley.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: It is the highlighting of exceptions to standard criteria at 24%. Did that concern you or the other governors or why ... how did it happen?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was the board concerned about exceptions, or would 24% be considered normal?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: And on your watch, Mr. Burrows? Was there a high level of exceptions?