Results 1,481-1,500 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, okay. One person you couldn't have failed to see, or hear, during the ten years of the bubble, was Mr. McWilliams. None of you commented on that. The substance of the quotes I gave, is that or is that not very accurate assessment of what actually happened?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Gentlemen, briefly, did any of the other two gentlemen, did any of you take any serious notice of what David McWilliams was writing about from 2000 onwards?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: We've had substantial evidence here in relation to that, Mr. McLaughlin, which bears out what you're saying. All the evidence that was given is the commercial lending and so on was huge. Just a last question to you three gentlemen. You covered property and construction in a number of your reviews. Was the level of risk concentration apparent to you at the time, as it occurred, or did you...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. McArdle?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Thank you. Mr. McLaughlin?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Gentlemen, were your inputs as economists used to influence the internal policies of your banks regarding issues of liquidity and solvency?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. McArdle?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Thank you. Mr. McLaughlin?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Thank you. And a technical question in regard to risk metrics in economic statistics. What mechanisms and data did you use to analyse the economic outlook that you delivered?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, Mr. Beggs?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: So, you're all using the same basic data, in other words, is what you're saying? Yes, okay. Mr. McLaughlin, just going back to the point of commercial property housing crash, etc. Would it be true to say that there is quite a link between them in the sense that significant commercial loans would have been given, as you clarified, for what were to be extensive residential developments, and...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, the ... a link. And the last question, Chair, is this. I think it was Mr. McArdle, it was yourself, I think, at an earlier stage you were beginning to take exception to the idea that forecasts, good or bad, may have had some input in relation to the bailouts, etc. that happened, when ... that ... could I just say to you that if the bank economists had what's, wrongly called, more...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Boucher, at a group risk policy committee in January 2007, the minute states that within retail six senior business manager portfolios and 21 business manager portfolios were rated unsatisfactory - a doubling since March 2005, and the report emphasises a need for a structured credit training programme. Can you explain that, please?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. So these senior business managers and business managers, their unsatisfactory rating, did that relate to property loans?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Considering that property lending was beginning to take, or continuing to take such a high profile, should that not have been done at that meeting, to have a profile on exactly where the credit problems were with these people?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: So-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Was the board made aware of this level of unsatisfactory reports regarding credit control?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: The minute also states, Mr. Boucher, "A review of the Legal Services Unit identified a backlog of files, some with serious issues, which could expose the Bank to significant risks." Can you explain that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Which volumes? Property loans?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Yes, but the NAMA chairman in his evidence to this committee spoke about... I quote him: The model did not appear to require a stringent approach by borrowers to analysing project feasibility. The safety zone of borrower equity usually existed only on paper. The result is that the borrower was typically not the first to lose. Do you recognise the Bank of Ireland in here?