Results 1,401-1,420 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: And again, it's strange to the outsider that you as the regulator would have to say, "Look, you'd better keep accounts of the possible repayment capacities of these borrowers", and so on but you actually had to do that on occasions, is that correct? Recommend that they had better records on their lending?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: And just before your signature on the last page, you noted that the role of external auditors, saying that "where such deficiencies are not flagged, auditors may be taken as indicating to the board and to [the] management that they have not identified any significant risk exposures, including in relation to property", and you go on to say, I would like a more root and branch approach to...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: I'm grateful for your observations. Do you think now that you'd see the role of external auditors ... I think it was mentioned this morning that some-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: -----some auditors had 200 staff and 20 partners in a bank, you had only three, I think, for Bank of Ireland and AIB combined, so would you see a role for external auditors and your office in the future? And thank you, Chairman, that is my last question.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: How many staff do you have now?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you very much.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman. Is a regulatory system with no sanctions, is it moral hazard and bound to fail?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Looking ahead ... and, you know, how do we prevent the next crisis, should we aim for a two-tier system, one regulated by you which carries your protections, and the other sort of, free-range, like, we don't reimburse losing lotto tickets or slow greyhounds, or whatever? Would that be a way to proceed, that we have a very tightly regulated sector which protects people's savings, and gambling...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Finally, May 2008, when you sought the extra staff, was that a normal shortage of staff or did you have premonitions of doom-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: -----a few months afterwards?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, thank you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman, and welcome. Do you believe that there were effective instruments available to deal with excessive credit growth and sector risk concentration?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: But doesn't that bring to one of our problems, Mr. Horan, that our banks seemed to do nothing else except invest in property at some stage? The remainder of the loan book was shrinking as a percentage of the total at a very rapid rate.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: So we needed them-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: You said that the measures, on page 7 of your paper, that the measures were the most stringent capital regime in Europe, but the downfall was also the most adverse. How did the most stringent rules produce the worst outcome?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: I see, yes. The opposition to the CRD requirements from within the industry, could you tell us something about that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Your statement on page 11, does that contradict that or does it apply to all banks? What you say that banks were woefully under capitalised and what would they need to do to bring themselves up to the capitalisation of Google, say, for example?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: How much more capital did they need, double it?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Double to triple. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman.