Results 1,361-1,380 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Smith, if I could turn to yourself, just in conclusion, and in a more general way. I think you hinted yourself and certainly your counterparts in the other three major auditing firms are adamant that no one, as it was put today, could have foreseen the collapse in the banking system and the crisis and the crash that resulted from the bubble, but could I just put it to you: Ernst and...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yet we had a witness in front of this, an economic commentator, David McWilliams, who said: "I think the Irish property crash and the banking crash were both incredibly predictable and absolutely preventable." And then he made reference to statements he made in 2003 in relation to the bubble and the banks and the huge extension of loans we had. Another witness, Alan Ahearne, referred to a...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Could I ask you, finally perhaps, Mr. Smith, would you see any ... would you agree in any way with some assertions that have been made in evidence here that, in the course of the bubble, you had institutions making inordinate, or massive by any scale, profits? You had senior executives in financial institutions and perhaps in related professions reaping extensive bonuses and huge material...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Gentlemen, I’ve just one question to sum up. We’re just coming to a conclusion of just north of 14 hours of testimony and questions from the four that are considered the giant auditing firms in this State, and giants internationally as well in the auditing world, who audited in this State the giants of the financial institutions. Up to the end of 2007 and reporting in the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Smith, you were the senior person in Ernst and Young. Your comment, please.

Ceisteanna - Questions (Resumed): Job Creation Data (19 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: 5. To ask the Taoiseach if he will report on job creation in 2014; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [5470/15]

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, thank you. Mr. Burrows it is long considered that a prudent loan-to-deposit ratio for banks should be of the order of 120% or lower. Why was this target so severely breached in the ... up to 2008, when it reached 176%?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Burrows, witnesses from Bank of Ireland have fairly consistently, some people might feel, have tried to diminish the extent of the losses or the mistakes by reference to competitors who fared much worse in the crash. Is that what you have just done now again?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: And was that a factor generally that led to so much crisis around the world?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: But does that beg the question Mr. Burrows whether ... was it appropriate to have reached that huge level of 176%? Was that appropriate?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: But the bank ... can you explain why the bank and, apparently from the documentation we have, your advisers at the time didn't see the danger that was looming here? Can you explain why that was the case?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: The Governor of the Central Bank, Patrick Honohan, said in an article, summer 2009, in The Economic and Social Review:A very simple warning sign used by most regulators to identify a bank exposed to increased risk is rapid balance sheet growth. An annual real growth rate of 20% is often taken as the trigger. And that growth rate and greater would have been appropriate or what Bank of...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, but the economy wasn't growing by anything like 20%, Mr. Burrows.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: A former US regulator, Bill Black, gave evidence to the inquiry, are you familiar with Mr. Black?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Mr. Black, who was a regulator and has a huge amount of experience in regulation and in dealing with bank crashes from the late 1980s and 1990s on, but he said a number of ingredients could be guaranteed in a banking system to cause catastrophic loses. Among those is grow like crazy, make terrible quality loans and employ extreme leverage. He said that these ingredients would...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: But Mr. Black and others would have been warning about this for even decades previous to what happened in Ireland. How come, Bank of Ireland, with the huge resources, research capacity, etc., wouldn't be aware of the dangers of this excessive drive for growth?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Burrows, Mr. Black's implication is that a drive, a greed for profit has led many banks to perdition and also huge remuneration for bank leadership like chairpeople and CEOs. Was greed for profit a factor in the huge drive for growth and in the downfall then of Bank of Ireland?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes but-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: The peer group that you were trying to emulate, Mr. Burrows-----