Results 1,301-1,320 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: How on earth can that be the case, Mr. Hurley? Deputy Doherty has already quoted to you from the memorandum of understanding. Let me quote again: "In this context, the Governor and/or Board's objective is to identify developments which could endanger the stability of the system as a whole and will advise accordingly.;". Now, in ... From the 1990s, lateish, on into the 2000s, house prices...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: And what did you do about it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: But, Mr. Hurley, with respect, the Central Bank is not a media outlet or a press commentary organisation, it is at the very top of the financial system and it is, as we see in the memorandum and as the Governor Honohan said, responsible for financial stability. So is it the case that you knew that, but you didn't do anything about it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Well, Mr. Hurley, a witness in front of this inquiry said, David McWilliams----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: David McWilliams: "I think the Irish property crash and the banking crash were both incredibly predictable and absolutely preventable." And the same Mr. McWilliams said on "Prime Time" in RTE in October 2003 and I quote:The Irish housing market is a scam. It is an enormous financial swindle that could potentially confine an entire generation of young Irish workers to years of bad debt. Far...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: But may I put it to you, Mr. Hurley, that it's not a question of seeing things differently; it's a question of analysis. Now you have long experience in the financial sector. You know, for example, the implosion of the banking system in Sweden in the late '80s and early '90s as a result of a speculative bubble. Alan Ahearne gave evidence here. He published, in 2005, or...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Hurley, the Governor of the Central Bank, Professor Honohan, said on page 16 of his report: "A regulatory approach [he was talking about in Ireland] which was and was perceived to be excessively deferential and accommodating, insufficiently challenging and not persistent enough". Do you agree with him?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Do you think a problem was caused by the 2003 legislation wherein page 23 of the core documents, section 5A(b) - I'll quote it, you don't' need to see it - it says that the Central Bank must "...promote the development within the State of the financial services industry (but in such a way as not to affect the objective of the Bank in contributing to the stability of the State's financial...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Was it the case that that legislation ... was it disastrous or not in its effect? To use a metaphor, did that legislation make the town sheriff responsible for the saloons, jazzing them up and making them profitable?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: At the same time, he was responsible for keeping the ranchers and cowboys who came into town in good order. Wasn't there an inevitable contradiction between the two? Was it the case, as some would say, that the sheriff understood that if he curbed the wilder instincts of the ranchers and cowboys, they would go elsewhere for their bootleg, etc.? And some would say that what happened as a...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Hurley, just on a quick point of clarification, when Deputy Doherty put to you your annual salary over a number of years of over €350,000 a year, you said to the effect public sector pay was too high. Could I ask you if you would consider qualifying that by saying that the highest paid public sector pay-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Because, as we know, there are thousands of very low paid public sector workers.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, because the majority, as we know, of public sector workers are either low paid or middle paid, yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Now, just a brief supplementary in response, or in following on from the questions of the Chair with regard to what was known as Project Atlas. Did the analysis that emerged from that prove to be accurate in the following months?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: But, if you take the next two years, would it be true to say that there was a serious underestimation of what the cost to the Irish people would be?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: But does this beg the question whether PricewaterhouseCoopers went behind what the banks just said to them and delved deeply into the background information?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: But were decisions made on the basis of that report with regard to, you know, continuing the guarantee that proved to be far more costly than might have been the case if the true state of affairs had been known in the end of September of 2008?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Hurley, you finished your statement to the inquiry and I quote:There was a strong view on the night that the Government had one opportunity to assuage the markets. If the decisions taken were considered inadequate and failed the consequences for the banking system would be devastating and lead to very serious economic and social fallout for the country as a whole. I will just repeat one...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: But even in the course of that reconfiguration, Mr. Hurley, and in the course of all that went on towards bailing out these entities, etc., and in relation to decisions that the Central Bank made, the question that is routinely put by commentators all over the media and everywhere else is ... is this measure or that measure enough to satisfy the markets? Is ... is ... are these cuts to...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, but it seems to be the case, or does it, that massive financial institutions, unelected and faceless, wield far more power over governments than the people who elect those governments? Would that be a fair assessment?