Results 1,241-1,260 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: When you mentioned it slowed down we found extremely slow correspondence between banks and the regulator. In one case that ... in the Honohan report, I think, a bank was felt to be problematic - Bank A, I think, he called it - in 2000, and it collapsed in 2008. Why was it taking so long to achieve regulatory control over that particular Bank A?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: The example I'm looking for is ... did people take much notice of when you were drawing matters to their attention in the Irish banking sector? And that's an example, an extreme one.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you. Chairman, that's in the core documents, Vol. 3, for this and it's on page 8, the story of Bank A, and if it's of assistance to Mr. O'Reilly, it will come up on his screen and I thank him for his account. But, so if Bank A was seriously problematic from 2000, "persistently problematic", says Honohan, from the year 2000 onwards and "prosecution ... was given detailed...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: -----to get-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: -----that-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: -----Bank A compliant?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was there consensus at the board level between the Central Bank and IFSRA about the regulatory approach to banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Were pressures put on you by the Department of Finance in relation to compliance statements and corporate governance guidelines?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: The Department of Finance.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: The Department of Finance, did they have misgivings?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: So, they didn't object to your directors' compliance statements or your corporate governance guidelines.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Did you find it difficult to get the banks to comply with sectoral concentration ratios?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: How do you mean you never got a proposal? Could you not have made the proposal?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Ms Burke wrote to a bank saying that they were outside what she regarded as the correct ratios, and they replied, "We're comfortable." Did you have difficulty in getting across to banks that they were over-concentrated in the property sector?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: A similar, if I may say, non-response to correspondence about loans-to-deposits, that some banks said, "Never mind, we can borrow from our parents in other countries." You know, there seemed to be a view that the regulator could be dismissed by the banks when he expressed concerns?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Could I bring you to page 40 in Vol. 3, a report of the financial stability co-ordination committee in 2004, and the financial------
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Page 40, Mr. O'Reilly. And the second paragraph refers to yourself, "The Financial-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: -----Regulator indicated his view that the banks were not convinced that there was an incipient risk building up in the banking sector." Was that not your job? I mean, the people at the party aren't going to object in the famous metaphor about taking the punch bowl away; they want the party to continue. Your job was to stop the party, not to ask them did they want the party to continue.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Like, should you not have insisted then, "Look, the overall growth of credit is going to build up risk in the Irish banking system, that's my job, I'm in charge here, and I'm telling you that, whether you think so or not, there's an excessive risk building up", which we now know exploded three or four years later? What's the regulator for if he's not, you know, refereeing the match as he sees it?