Results 12,141-12,160 of 15,555 for speaker:Eoghan Murphy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Let me move on to the regulation model. I do not know whether it is a contradiction in Mr. Regling's report but he talks about the structure or regulatory model at the time having been an experiment and about it coming from a compromise. When his colleague, Mr. Watson, was in front of the finance committee, he said in relation to not having the prudential director on the board that everyone...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: To be clear on that, although there were clearly problems in putting together this regulatory infrastructure, no matter what design we might have ended up with and no matter why we ended up with it, ultimately, given the way it was implemented it was not going to work in the way it should have.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Mr. Regling spoke about the view in Europe prior to our crisis and bank guarantee on letting a bank fail. Was there a view or policy on bank nationalisation?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: I will ask my final question. Mr. Regling mentioned culture and talked about cultural attitudes in this country. When Mr. Wright, who was in the Ministry responsible for finance in Canada, was before us, he referred in his report to Ireland failing the test of prudent fiscal management. Does Mr. Regling see any cultural problems or aspects in this country that make it difficult for us to...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: I want to examine the idea of the rainy day fund which you, Professor Lane, have mentioned a few times this morning. Your point is essentially that because we moved from a taxation base that was pro-cyclical – I think Mr. Regling’s report refers to going from 12% to 30% - that money should have been ring-fenced for a rainy day fund, for future difficulties.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: We were running budget surpluses at the time but you also make the point that they were not big enough. In one of your papers you stated that underneath it all there was a structural deficit. Mr. Regling said this morning that we are still not good at working out that structural imbalance under the economy.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: So our true structural imbalance is something we can see only after the fact.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: When talking about a rainy day fund, what place does the National Pension Reserve Fund, NPRF, have?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: We pursued the wrong investment strategy with the NPRF.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: From the point of view of this crisis we did.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Was it a mistake to divest the NPRF when we did and invest that in the banks, regardless of where the money went in the banks? Was the timing of the divestment a mistake?
- Written Answers — Department of Public Expenditure and Reform: Early Retirement Scheme (20 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: 265. To ask the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform his plans to extend the retirement grace period beyond June 2015 for teachers who cannot retire during the academic year (details supplied). [2822/15]
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: This morning, Professor Honohan made a number of references to Lehman Brothers and I want to go back to September 2008. On page 18 of the report on the banking crisis, Professor Honohan stated:Some also still feel that, without the external shocks of September 2008, the system would have survived without imposing a cost to the Government. The report does not share this view. Why does he...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Is it a credible point of view to hold?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: I mean the idea that the system would have survived without imposing a cost to Government.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Can we reject the idea of Lehman Brothers as a catalyst?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: How important was the rejection by the US Congress of the troubled asset relief program, TARP 1 at that time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: When Professor Honohan speaks about the idea of emergency liquidity assistance buying us time and letting us get deeper into the problem, would it have been possible, with ELA, perhaps not to remove the cost to the State but to reduce the cost if we had gone down that avenue?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Even a short period of time, such as several days to a weekend, could have helped identify the issues Professor Honohan referred to earlier, such as Anglo Irish Bank not being worth saving.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Time could have been important. Why was ELA rejected at the time?