Results 1,181-1,200 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: And budgetary policy, and sorry for rushing you-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: -----a bit-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: ----- what's changed there?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: The changes and improvements in budgetary policy.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: The relations with the Central Bank, you know that ... shouldn't your predecessors have been saying, "Hey, you know, thanks for all that advice on how to run the Department of Finance and Central Bank. If you guys stopped increasing credit at 25% a year"-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: You know, should the advice have been two-way? Would you advise ... would you think now, monetary and fiscal policy should be integrated in a way in which they apparently weren't, leading up to the crisis?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: Are the reforms assured?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: And, finally, just on page 4 of your witness statement, you refer to the seconded economist from the Central Bank. How does the Department of Finance ensure the independence of a secondee from his or her previous role, say, in the Central Bank?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: And capture ... you're protected against capture you said, yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: Yes. Thank you very much. And thank you, Chairman.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman, and welcome, Mr. Considine. In your opinion, did you feel that, during the course of your tenure in the Department of Finance, that the Department of Finance was well informed by the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator as to matters concerning financial stability?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: If I bring you to page 73 of your own Vol. 1 in the core document, the briefing of the new Minister for Finance in 2004, and Nyberg notes, "However, the brief was silent in relation to credit growth." So that rather contradicts what you've just said to us, that the Minister wasn't briefed in relation to credit growth according to Nyberg in that section on page 73.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: But you didn't do it on that occasion when you were meeting the new Minister. Could I bring you to page 119 of the same document, the briefing of the Minister in the same year, which says that, "[T]he Bank expresses concern about the high rate of credit growth [...] which has been increasing by around 25 per cent." And the advice to the Minister is to say that the Central Bank and the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: On page 75, Nyberg says:There is no evidence that the DoF [Department of Finance] was particularly concerned with prudential matters or in assessing any possible financial stability concerns relating to either individual institutions or the financial system collectively. The annual Financial Stability Reports [to which we've referred] ... did not contain any critical analysis.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: On page 73:In particular, substantive discussions do not appear to have taken place directly between the DoF [Department of Finance] and the CB [Central Bank] on the content of the various Financial Stability Reports, either before or after their publication ... no officials were present and there appear to be no records of the discussion in either departmental [the Department] or CB [Central...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: I read at page 75:The Spring 2007 QEC [quarterly economic commentary] also noted that if the astonishing growth in net foreign borrowing by Irish credit institutions since 2003 had been used to fund the ongoing boom in the housing market, the situation was not sustainable. This particular point does not appear to have been followed up the DoF [Department of Finance] or brought to the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: When you were on the board ... or the council of the ESRI and the board of the Central Bank and the Secretary General, did it come to your attention, because it's been in evidence here, that a man who's code named "Nervous Nelly" in the Department of Finance rang up Professor John FitzGerald to complain about the content of a report? And there was also ... Mr. O'Connell said that he rang the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: And thank you for that. Because I would have some concern that the apparent consensus that's been referred to was, in fact, manufactured because of the way the contrarians may have been silenced in one way or another and I thank you for your clarification because I would not like if such had occurred. The IMF concerns about house prices in Ireland ... you know, double digit growth rates in...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: Did the Department monitor commercial property prices at all?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Sean Barrett: And a last one, if I may, thank you, Mr. Considine. That ... while there are rumours, I suppose, that the Department of Finance was against directors' compliance statements ... that Nyberg says he could find no evidence that the Department of Finance gave explicit instructions to the Financial Regulator not to proceed with the implementation of that provision. Have you ... like to cast on...