Results 11,621-11,640 of 15,555 for speaker:Eoghan Murphy

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: And you were in agreement that the methodology should be-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: If I could move now to the reliance by the bank on interbank lending, securities, short-term commercial lending and wholesale funding, were you aware of the extent of the tracker mortgage interest rate risk in AIB that you were taking on over that period and was it ever discussed with the board?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: I mean, that was just an accounting tool, though. I mean, more than 50% of your residential loan book was tracker mortgages.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: I mean, in terms of the practice of having to borrow ... to lend at one rate and borrow at a higher rate and the risks inherent in that.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: But do you think the bank understood those risks or the scale of those risks?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. Why did the bank ... why was there a significant increase in the issuance of short-term commercial paper funding, given the short tenure and volatility of such instruments, you know, when it comes to a credit crisis? I mean, if you look at ... just to give you the figures ... in the end of the financial year 2004, AIB increased-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: That's correct.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Increased its commercial paper by €6.2 billion, a 300% increase year on year, to assist in funding balance sheet growth.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: I'm sorry. There was-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Yeah. Well, sorry. I-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Mr. Forde, there was a significant increase in the issuance of short-term commercial paper funding in AIB when you were managing director, a 300% increase year on year. It's a risky thing to do for the reason that we've just been discussing. In a credit crisis, when people then call in these issuances where there's no lending on the interbank market, you then run into trouble in terms of...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Why did you ... why did it increase? Why did it expand?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. And, to your knowledge, was there a practice of restructuring criticised loans, agreeing to moratoriums, interest only, interest roll-up, extending terms and conditions in the period 2006 to 2008?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Yes, sorry, we're moving into the solvency issue debate ... restructuring criticised loans.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: 2006 to 2008.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Well, it began to increase quite quickly then, the criticised loans?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Yes, yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: And then what does that tell you then about the quality of the loans that were being given out then in the period-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: I want to take you back, if I might, just to your opening statement, just to clarify something then, because you said in your opening statement, which I know you didn't get to read out in full, "The first point of failure came with the collapse of economic activity and the manner in which it undermined repayment capacity." Just elaborate on that point for me, please. When did the problems...