Results 1,121-1,140 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you very much. Thank you, Chair.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman. Do we know the nationalities of that OECD team that came to Ireland in 2008?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes. Could you tell us, yes?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: While you're looking, I mean, they would quite likely come from countries which had a much smaller banking crisis than Ireland, so, I think, listening to them ... could I point out when you compare, in Vol. 3, the summary recommendations on financial stability on page 20 that the OECD recommended ... there were five and only three of them made it through to the final version which is on page...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Okay. Now, page 61 in Vol. 2, the final question - and thanks, Chairman - your notes for the Minister, "the bank expresses concern about ... high current rate of credit growth, including mortgage credit, which has been increasing ... around 25 per cent.", and the Minister advised, "I would encourage the Central Bank and Financial Regulator to remain vigilant on the issue of personal credit...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: 124 was "[We] note[d] [on 10 July 2008] Irish banks were well capitalised with good asset quality and the banking sector's shock absorption capacity remains strong." That was only ... that was in July and, you know, they were in trouble by late August and September.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, and welcome back, Mr. Cardiff. The ... when you said ... when you were here last week, you said, on page 36 of your evidence, "the actual supervision system they were working within wasn't designed that way ... because the political system ... had decided they wanted a different supervision system and ... they imposed that model". Given that the Department of Finance had ultimate...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Right. And that was political advisers, rather than Ministers, was it, that-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: And did that affect your tenure as the Secretary General?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: No, I'm just seeing, in your evidence, that interference in the regulation of banks, which, as we know, caused so much problems in 2008 and afterwards, would you have any wider observation? What should have been done, instead of that kind of interference?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: In the case of the organisations which were subsequently nationalised, was it mentioned on the night of the guarantee that a quid pro quowould be the removal of the boards and the management of ... of those companies?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Because money was lost between the guarantee and the nationalisation. I think it did go up by about €4 billion, I think, is that what Governor Honohan estimated was the extra cost of delaying the nationalisation?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Would we have saved money if we'd asked them to go on the night of the guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: You mention, on page 6 of your larger document, "In [...] normal times, INBS should not have been a big problem to solve." Isn't there evidence from Nyberg, Honohan and so on that at least one of those banks had been a problem for eight years? I think it's called "Bank A" in one of ... one of the reports. So, why, in normal times, did we not say, "Look, there's a bank which is not...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: I presume it does, yes. I think that, yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: But it was taking eight years. Just in your shorter statement, you said to us, on page 6 I think ... sorry page 14, "There was real concern that the ECB should be kept 'in the loop'." And you criticised Mr. Trichet last week. How should that have operated, the relationship between the ECB and yourselves?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes. Just ... if ... did anything occur to you in the intervening week on the identity of Mr. DD that you mentioned last week?