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Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. I'm just wondering, how close to reality are these exercises? I mean, do the observations that are made in the simulation, do they translate to the real world?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: One lesson learned by the Financial Regulator was that the ... there was insufficient contact between the regulator and the Department of Finance and the Central Bank's feedback was that finance was out of the picture. So was that in the exercise or does that reflect the reality?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: In Mr. Hurley's evidence, when discussing the stress testing exercises, he said that "One of the conclusions was that there was too quick a movement to a guarantee in the context of the stress test''. Do you remember that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. Do you recall the 2005 crisis simulation exercise? You were working in banking supervision at the time.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Because one of the observations from that exercise was that there was a lack of clarity about the supervisory regime and the nature of information that would be available in a real crisis. That was following the exercise in 2005. Do you recall that at the time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: And would they have been acted upon?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: But did that sentiment remain true into 2008 when the actual crisis emerged, that there was a lack of clarity about the supervisory regime and the nature of information that would be available in a real crisis?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Sure, but the observation that was made from the exercise here in Ireland in 2005 still stood when the crisis emerged in 2008?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Of course. No, I think my point related to the feedback that was given after the exercise and then whether or not it was acted upon. But if we can look at the scoping paper that was prepared by the Department of Finance at the end of 2007 - were you involved in the preparation of that scoping paper? It looked at possible powers to be given to the Minister for Finance to guarantee the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: It came up with our discussions with Mr. Hurley. So when we look at the preparation or the agreement in early 2008, that legislation would be drafted to empower the Minister to guarantee the banks and nationalise financial institutions - do you recall that, those discussions?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: With Mr. Hurley we discussed as well the green jersey agenda where ... the Financial Regulator and the Central Bank Governor went to financial institutions and asked them to provide each other with funding support in order to maintain financial stability, given what was happening in international markets. Were you kept informed of this agenda, this action?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: At the time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. And in your view was this agenda designed to support any particular institution?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: And given what was happening in relation to the work of the domestic standing group in early 2008, and the approaches being made at the time by the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator, do you think that, looking back now, that the Government should have intervened in the banking system in March 2008, or closely after?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Prior to that, prior to the share difficulty that one institution ran into in March 2008, the domestic standing group was already talking about possibly guaranteeing all liabilities in Irish banks. It was already looking at legislation to potentially nationalise a bank, liquidate one. So these concerns would have been there at the time, before then we had this extraordinary event in March 2008.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay, let's move on to ... then, to July 2008. There was a domestic standing group meeting, and it's on page 124 and 125 of the booklet. The core booklet, Vol. 2.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Page 124. So you represented the Financial Regulator at this meeting?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: And if we just go down to the ... the bottom paragraph, there's a discussion held concerning the increase risk of a general loss of confidence in Irish banks, and the international viewpoint provided at the meeting is that the banks will see significant loan losses and would need to raise significant capital, and would be disadvantaged in doing so on account of the delay in going to the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Vol. 2.

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