Results 11,061-11,080 of 15,555 for speaker:Eoghan Murphy

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: And at this point had you already discussed, in the domestic standing group, the idea of a domino effect? Or a contagion effect?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Implicit right the way through?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: That one bank could-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: -----bring the other banks down?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. So, should concerns ... these concerns and these actions, taken in March 2008, they were clearly expressed and acted upon by the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator ... should they have prompted emergency intervention by the Government in one or more of the Irish banks at the time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Despite ... I beg your pardon ... despite the drop in shares-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: -----from, I think, €50 billion to €30 billion in Irish share prices in a period of six months up until March 2008?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: That wasn't seen as a significant enough fall in share prices?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: But should the Government have intervened in March 2008 with a bank or with the system formally, as opposed to what the Central Bank Governor and the Financial Regulator were doing themselves?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay, thank you. I'll move on from that, if I may.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Just, then, looking back at the ... the rapid growth in the bank balance sheets between 2003 and 2008 up to that period. I mean, should the Central Bank have been more active in assessing the asset quality of the banks?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chair. In a simulation exercise in 2007, did fear over the asset qualities in the banks come up on the Central Bank side?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Were you involved in that simulation?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. And so when we see the concerns raised by the Central Bank after the simulation about asset quality, is that you raising those concerns?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Ms Burke. You're very welcome. You were head of banking supervision from 2006 to 2008 ... May 2006. So, did that come with supervisory powers of the banks?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. In evidence ...in evidence from Mr. Hurley he said that the Central Bank was divested of supervisory powers over financial institutions after the 2003 Act. So, would you agree with that statement?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay, but as head of banking supervision, did you have supervisory powers of the banks?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: So after the 2003 Act, the Central Bank still had supervisory powers over the financial institutions?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay, but ... just trying to clarify-----