Results 10,961-10,980 of 15,555 for speaker:Eoghan Murphy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Well, he did say that the on-site inspections ... the level was low, and you just mentioned the ... the determination of how they'd carry out the inspections, the risk rating, and the C&AG criticised that as well in 1999 and in 2007, and what did you do about those criticisms?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: He said that successive reports ... sorry, I don't have the C&AG's report in front of me, this is actually in the Honohan report on page 64.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Successive reports of the C&AG have urged improvement in the methodology, and that being the system evaluating risk, using such factors as supervisory complexity, corporate governance, business and reputational risk, and so on, based on regular statistical reports provided by credit institutions on their activities and financial conditions. I suppose, Mr. Neary, my point is ... or my...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You're saying those concerns were addressed?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: In 2005, you had a three-person team responsible for both Bank of Ireland and Anglo Irish Bank, in terms of those inspections. Was that an adequate number of people?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay, so, could you have known what was happening in the banks, in those two institutions, with those three people?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: The answer is that, yes, that three-person team was sufficient for giving you a level of information on the banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay, and I have to move on because my time is short. If I could look at just stress testing, if I may, Mr. Neary. The stress testing that was conducted in 2006, and there's a reference in core documents, Vol. 3, page 35.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Of Vol. 3.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: The 2006 stress tests, were you involved in designing those stress tests?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. The Financial Regulator wasn't involved in deciding the methodologies of the variables-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Would you have been aware of the scenarios being put in the stress tests to the banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Well just ... if you could help me clarify, because there was two scenarios put to the banks to test for. Shock scenario one was the extreme scenario and had a number of variables, and one was a decline in house prices by 40%, in the extreme scenario. Shock scenario two was the weak scenario and it had the same variables at different levels but the decline in house prices in the weak...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Well, actually, the IMF, if I can find the document in front of me, the IMF ... the Central Bank was ... oversaw the stress test results, and the IMF did comment on them-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: -----and the IMF said that they welcomed these results but observed that the long period of strong economic performance limits the ability to quantify the relationship between macroeconomic variables and credit risks. And was there a response from the Financial Regulator to the ... that comment, from the IMF?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: That was in the 2006 country report from the IMF and they did flag a concern with those stress tests that were conducted. But, just to come back to that point on the two shock scenarios, can you help us as to why in an extreme scenario and a weak scenario, in stress testing the bank's books, you would have a decline of property prices at 40% for both? Why would you do that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Could it have been that something was suspected as to the quality of the lending in relation to property?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Why was it then, in the letters that were written to the banks to conduct this stress test, they asked for special attention to be given to the performance of property and consumer-related lending?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chair. It is on page 41 of Vol. 3. It is an e-mail. I won't say who it is from, but it is from someone in the Financial Regulator's office to one of the banks. It is talking about one of the questions that the IMF wants to look at in particular, when they come to meet the banks to look at the stress testing that they have done themselves. They want to know:... how sensitive...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: And the concerns that the IMF had-----