Results 10,721-10,740 of 15,555 for speaker:Eoghan Murphy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. When things like sectoral limits were breached by individual banks, would the Department be made aware of this by the regulator?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You as a member of the board of the Central Bank, would you have been made aware when breaches were reported to the regulator?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: But, when the regulator then, when things were reported to the actual Central Bank, the CBFSAI board, which had an oversight role, would those things then be reported in to that board?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay, but then in, from your recollection, from your time on the board, you do not remember breaches of sectoral concentration limits being discussed then, in that process?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. Did the Department review the establishment of the new structure at all in the years following its establishment, when you were Secretary General of the Department of Finance?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You mention this, but also Patrick Neary mentioned it as well, when he was before us, about the limits being more of a guideline. Why were they only a guideline?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: But would it not fall to the Department of Finance, in terms of the legislation to establish the regulator, whether or not things like sectoral limits would be guidelines or be strict rules to be enforced?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: But when Mr. Neary tells us, as he did, and it's on page 31 of the transcript from his session here, that there was no legal or supervisory remedy in relation to breaches of the limit, the question is should there have been and, if so, did the responsibility not fall to the Department?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: But the regulator never came to you and said there's a deficiency.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Were deficiencies ever discussed during your time on the board on the Central Bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. But, just to clarify that, the regulator never came to you, looking for-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. When the chairman of the regulator, Mr. Patterson, was before us, on page 111 of his transcript, excuse me, he said that the sector concentration limits were relaxed in the 1990s to attract one particular large foreign bank, and as a result the limits were then relaxed for everyone.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Would you care to comment on it?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You don't recall the concentrations being weakened in the 1990s for one particular bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You don't recall any discussion of that, then, later on, on in relation to sector concentration limits.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. I'll move on from that, then, if I may, to the Wright report. You have read the Wright report, I take it? Do you accept its findings?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: I'll put those things to you, and ask if you agree with them then. On page 23 of the Wright report, "the public and policy makers were insufficiently sensitive to the effects of extraordinarily expansive monetary conditions at the time, and to the fact that fiscal policy was the key potential counterbalance to this pressure". Does this finding apply to you in your role at the top of the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: That's why I'm asking if it applies to you in your role.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: So on page 25 of the Wright report, paragraph 3.3.7:As the representative of the Public Service employers, the Department of Finance had an important input to the Partnership Process, and consistently warned of growing threats to competitiveness. But it did not drive the process, and was reluctant to oppose packages that included outcomes that retained labour peace for the economy as a whole....
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Reflecting on the graph we looked at earlier in relation to the memorandum in June and the budget decisions in December, Wright also says on that same page 25:Relatively clear advice to Cabinet in June on the risks of excessive spending and tax reductions was lost by the time of December Budgets. Spending pressures of this magnitude could have been resisted even within the established Budget...