Results 10,641-10,660 of 14,090 for speaker:Marc MacSharry
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: In your role as head of the Central Bank, have you a fiduciary duty to the Central Bank or who are you overall responsible to?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Okay. Was it difficult to maintain a line of difference between the two roles?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: My time is running out so ... in reality, is it fair to say that in your role at the ECB you had to be party and conscious and reflect decisions and thought processes that were good for the entire ECB rather than the individual benefit of Ireland?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Is that true or not?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Okay so-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Had you an equal voice or were bigger players' opinions weighted in a preferential way ... such as Germany, France ... large countries-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: So, in effect, because of the size of their economy, there is, in practice, a bigger weighting for their opinions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Yes or no?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: You mentioned in your statement that, "Attempts to influence the flow of external funds into Ireland would have amounted to capital controls which would have been inconsistent with monetary union." That's on page 7 of your statement. So, when interest rates were at 2% and growth rates were at 5%, 6%, 7%, 8% here, did you ever say, for example, in the ECB, ''Look, we need interest rates to...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Yes. This ... this is the key to my point. When you were conscious of giving fiscal advice, that there was too much of a pro-cyclical view being taken on a national basis in fiscal policy, what were you doing in an international context to help cool the market from an Irish perspective?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Which was the European perspective. So, again, back to my original question. Were you hampered in your work as Central Bank chief here by your responsibilities to the ECB in the context of market intervention?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: No, I'm putting it that way-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: The ... under Article 14.3, the ECB can intervene to give guidelines and directions to the bank. This is Article 14.3 of the treaty of the ECB. Why was this never invoked, or sought to be invoked, by you to help cool the market in this country?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Yes, last question then. As ... as somebody who was Secretary General of three Departments, you would've been used to providing advice for various Governments over the year and then the Minister then would have to take a decision. Isn't that what happens?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Okay. So, is the practice ... or the practice at that time of the Governor of the Central Bank always being a former director general, is it in any way flawed do you think, or not, on the basis that the ... the Secretary General is very much an advisory role, whereas heading a Central Bank needs ... to act, to be decisive, to take decisions ... under the '71 Act, albeit your interpretation...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Thanks very much and welcome again Mr. Hurley. Can I just go back to where Deputy Phelan had mentioned earlier on, on page 165 and the bullet points for Cabinet and the contemporaneous note there at the end ... just in relation to that, was there a specific question or query that Mr. Doyle or Minister Lenihan had asked you to ask or seek out with ECB representatives, which they may have been...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: So is it reasonable, and correct me if I'm wrong here, that ... to say that the Minister or the Secretary of the Department, Mr. Doyle, had tasked you or asked you to, through the ECB, see if there was the potential to allow banks fail or was it specific to something like that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Okay. So it's possible is it, or not, that ... this note relates to the lack of a response that there was a European initiative to deal with the impending crisis?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: But not by that time. What was the response?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Yourself, in your own testimony, you said that the Government "was expected to stand behind its banks and a Lehman's-type situation was to be avoided", according to page 14 of your written statement and I mention it again there. Indeed, many other witnesses have said that there was a prevailing thought that no bank should be permitted to fail - as you put it, another Lehman's ought to be...