Results 1,021-1,040 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: Okay, thank you for that. The Regling and Watson evidence book has that after 2004, the IMF, the OECD and ECOFIN all clearly recommended a tighter fiscal stance and the building up of a cushion for the time when the income from the property-related transactions would fall. Why, in your opinion, were these recommendations not more forcefully highlighted in policy?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: And just in this segment, the final one, that the Department advised the Minister in July '08 that economic growth would recover, even after allowing for a 45% decline in housing completions to 45,000 a year. And there was earlier research, in 2004, that every 10,000 reduction in housing output would cost the Government €500 million, so what was happening to our forecasts in that period?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: 2008, yes. Well, I'll give it to you again: the Department advised the Minister that economic growth would recover after allowing for a 45% decline in housing completions to 45,000 a year and a further decline of 23% to 33,000 units in 2009. And the earlier work had been, in 2004 ... that every 10,000 reduction in housing output would cost the Government €500 million in ... in revenue.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: Okay, thank you. Could I bring you back to your ... your first posting in banking in the Department of Finance, I see here, 1986 to 1992. So, I'll put that question to you: when Donal McNally was in charge of banking supervision, the banks were solvent, the bank manager in the local town was an honoured member of the community - where did it all go wrong, the €64 billion of what...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: So, in your early time, would banks have a different philosophy, interpreting what you said, a sort of community-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: -----service, minding people's savings, was that, sort of, their emphasis?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: And do you think the culture of the management and the boards of Irish banks changed?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: When you were then back in Finance, you mentioned to my colleague, Senator D'Arcy, that you were trying to restrain the growth of public expenditure and to drive down the debt-to-GDP ratio. Did it ever occur in those conversations that maybe the correct stance from the Department of Finance would be to look at the rate of growth of credit? Central Bank was telling you to...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: Wouldn't it have required massive physical surpluses to counteract such huge monetary expansion?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes. Did it ever arise that people would say, "We're now in a currency union dominated by Germany and that it's risky for Ireland to expand credit into the economy faster than the dominant country", i.e. Germany?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was the definition of competitiveness - and you have that on page 3 of your written address - was it inadequate in that the very rapid rise in house prices was not really reflected in the consumer price index so that houses were getting from two and a half times incomes up to ten times incomes and ... and there was nothing to restrain that, in the interest of competitiveness?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: And the sectoral concentration of all this lending did that ... was that discussed in the Department of Finance?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes. Thank you. And the commercial lending, which the evidence to this committee was extremely volatile was ... did that set off any alarm bells or discussions and so on in the Department?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: The ... so we were operating ... your own quote there, on page 6, "To offset the pro-cyclical effect of low interest rates and easy money would have required running a significant General Government Surplus ...". Was that going beyond any bounds of political feasibility, that the surplus required to have €64 billion ready on 29 September 2008 would have been impossible for any...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: You said, on page 7, that there was only limited contrarian views in the Department of Finance, but I think you've expressed a good number of them about those property proposals and the SSIAs and so could you tell us about how decisions were made?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: In the Department of Finance, yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: But you presented this morning a picture of more discussion than might be indicated here. You say that there was ... in your presentation there was only "limited contrarian views", but there seemed to have been a bit more discussion than that, that if you had doubts about the SSIAs or certain seaside resort building schemes and so on, that that was actually discussed within the Department.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes, there was a famous member, who shall be nameless, of course, whose nickname was "Dr. No" for that purpose.