Results 1,001-1,020 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Well, the fact that the price of a home for an ordinary working person was going up with the equivalent of the average industrial wage each year for ten years, was that not a cause of a massive discussion with the Minister?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, but, Mr. Considine, how does that justify ripping off young people and extending their mortgages to 35 and 40 years? I mean, the industry ripping them off in terms of ... of the equivalent of the average industrial wage each year-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: It started at three minutes rather than five-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Sorry, Mr. Considine.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: I know, but why was it not the cause of a massive debate inside in the Department with the Minister and action taken to stop it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Was it perhaps a reality, or not, Mr. Considine, that the interests of big property developers and big builders took precedence with the political leadership of the country over the interest of home buyers?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: But that was the reality, that massive profits were made on the backs of young people buying a home. Is that not the case, or is it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Mr. Considine, in March 2006 the Revenue Commissioners wanted to impose stamp duty on contracts for difference and there was strong lobbying by stockbrokers and interested parties against that. In a book, The Fitzpatrick Tapes,by Tom Lyons and Brian Carey, it was said that on 22 March you were emailed by Davy Stockbrokers significant ... heavily lobbying against this, that...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: So was it the case that powerful interest, stockbrokers-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: -----stockbrokers, developers seemed to win out over the interest of the small people, let's put it like that? And then finally, since I have to conclude, Mr. Considine-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, I know. I'm putting my last question and the last one was a question as well. But, Mr. Considine, after this very heavy lobbying by Davy Stockbrokers and others, you resigned a few months later and then, within six months, you were employed by Davy Stockbrokers. Would you not see a problem of ... with that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Doyle, could you tell us, just very briefly, relating to PricewaterhouseCoopers loan book analysis of Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society around the guarantee time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: PricewaterhouseCooper. No, it's-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Well, there is reference to it, yes, in the Department of Finance, Vol. 2, page 113, but I would ... I think this is well known. I'm not asking you for a specific-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: -----thing.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, but in relation to that looking Mr. Doyle, were you made aware that this look was really depending on the banks' own management information?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: But did it or did it not emerge later really, in view of the huge amount that was spent on the guarantee, that there should have been a much more thorough and forensic examination? Rather than relying on ... and can I refer to one document ... that's from William Beausang, it's not in the book but it's cleared for display ... from William Beausang, e-mail, and yourself is copied into that...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Would it be true to say, Mr. Doyle, that in the case of Irish Nationwide, more was known. and that really by the guarantee night, it should have been clear from the evidence that it was not solvent? Can I refer to core document Vol. 2, page 6? And this relates Mr. Doyle to the-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: It's Vol. 2 of the ... your document.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: DDO, Vol. 2, David Doyle.