Results 961-980 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Finally, Mr. Moran, you indicated at the beginning the necessity of a clash of ideas and challenging ideas. Statements I've heard attributed to you and even today might indicate a belief in a capitalism that is red in tooth and claw. I'd be interested in seeing what your attitude is if you look at the sweep of the last ten to 20 years in the financial sector internationally. Nyberg said, I...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. Mr. Moran, in 2005, when you were assistant secretary for the budget and economic division in the Department of Finance, the Department of the environment expressed concerns at the effect of the introduction of 100% mortgages, indicating that it could give rise to serious indebtedness of households. And in response, the Department of Finance adopted the position this was a consumer...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: You can't cast any light on it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, thank you. Mr. Moran, in the course of the bubble period, when you were in the budget and economic division and then in the taxation policy division, we have evidence in the core books - which I'm not going to take the time to put up - but of strong lobbying by construction interests and developer interests. There is an example of a letter refracted through a member of parliament from...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. That's Vol. 3, page 52.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: But, were you keenly aware of the extent of lobbying and pressure by powerful construction or developer interest on the Department or on the political leadership of the Department in the course of that time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: No, it doesn't surprise me either or it wouldn't surprise anybody, I think, that there would be submissions. But, the point is, were you aware of the impact of more powerful sectors on policy?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: But would you say that the tax break that Senator O'Keeffe mentioned and the extent of that which was significant, would you say that the significance of that tax break and how long it lasted, those tax breaks, and how long they lasted, could be attributed to the power of the construction and developer-led industries?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Last question, Mr. Moran. From freedom of information and other sources, we believe that the current policy of the Department of Finance is that house prices should rise ... it would be a good thing if house prices went up. And The Sunday Business Post, just Sunday gone out, said that there would be a €200 million fund from the National Pensions Reserve Fund to developers in relation...

Employment Equality (Amendment) Bill 2015: Referral to Select Committee (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: I move:That the Bill be referred to the Select Committee on Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation pursuant to Standing Orders 82A3(a) and 118.

Employment Equality (Amendment) Bill 2015: Second Stage (Resumed) [Private Members] (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Tá sé stairiúil go bhfuil Dáil Éireann ag glacadh inniu le Bille a ordaíonn nach féidir le heagraíocht chreidimh nó eagraíocht faoi stiúradh nó faoi smacht eagraíochta creidimh leatrom a dhéanamh ar aon duine atá nó a d'fhéadfadh a bheith fostaithe i seirbhísí a eagraíonn na...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Considine. Mr. Considine, you were on the board of the Central Bank of Ireland from 2002 to 2006. Over that period, from your observations and experience, do you think that board members had the knowledge and expertise necessary to judge on the macro-financial stability matters that arose?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: But there were more overall facts as well, Mr. Considine, particularly with relation to the rapid growth in the banks. Can I quote to you from the then Governor, or at a later time Governor of the Central Bank, Patrick Honohan, in the report that he did into the banking crisis, page 217:A very simple warning sign used by most regulators to identify a bank exposed to increased risk is rapid...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, I heard you saying it first time, Mr. Considine.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: But, I mean, Mr. Considine, you were a long, long time in around finance issues. You must have been aware, for example, of the Scandinavian banking crisis in the 80s and into the 90s based on speculation, property, and massive over-lending by the banks. Would that not have caused you, and indeed other board members, to fear and to understand indeed, that the same could happen here?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Considine, there were voices from early in the 2000s, loudly raised, warning of the dangers. Did that not make any impact on people like yourself?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Thanks, Mr. Considine. Some people would say that notwithstanding the international storm that the ... there was sufficient elements within the Irish situation for a blow-up and a crash in any case but I want to move on-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Considine, was the Department of Finance ever asked to undertake studies on the effects of the strong credit growth of the Irish banks, the effect that that might have on financial stability generally?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: I ... I have no doubt that other Deputies will get on to that, Mr. Considine, but just ... I know you did ongoing monitoring etc., but that there was no specific request to the Department in relation to a very rapid growth in the banks in your time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, can I move on to a different thing. John Hurley was Governor of the Central Bank in your time, yes? In his opening statement, on page 12, he said, "I was not aware of contrarian views within the Central Bank, which differed in substance from the Bank's overall assessment." And again said, "Views, which set out a different risk assessment, were not made known to me or to the Board in...