Results 9,641-9,660 of 15,555 for speaker:Eoghan Murphy

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay, and were you involved then with the Financial Regulator's five by five big developer exposure inspection of the five banks and the five biggest exposures that happened in December 2007?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Well, if you weren't involved then I'll move on. So coming back then to September 2008 and just before the guarantee, in fact, there's a presentation to the board entitled "Strategic Options" from David Drumm. He notes how the market sees Anglo as a monoline bank with a concentration risk in commercial property and he's proposing a merger with Irish Life and Permanent to create a more...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. But so, when the consideration came, I mean, what did that say to you as a senior person in the bank? Did it tell you ... did it say to you that the business had failed, that the approach that Anglo had taken in the market wasn't successful, that now it found itself in this position?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chair. At that point, and just immediately prior to the guarantee, did you believe that the bank was failing? And my second question is, I mean, was the bank beyond saving at that point?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Moran. Just one other area I want to look at very briefly, if I may, is the development lending and Anglo's exposure to it in 2008, because in March 2008, your bank's exposure to development lending was 15% of the loan book. By December, the exposure is at 23%, but this wasn't because you'd increased your lending; it was because you reclassified a...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: This is to do with a results announcement that you made to analysts from London and Dublin in December '08 in which 15% of the loan book had been said, in March, to be development lending exposure, but it is a reclassification that brings it to 23% at December '08, which is pretty significant, because it actually changed quite significantly the exposure the bank had at the time to speculative...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: You spoke about it at that meeting with analysts.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Do you remember why that reclassification took place?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: You can't. Okay. Thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Thank you Chairman and thank you Mr. Went. You're very welcome. I want to look at the area, if I may, of the wholesale markets and wholesale funding and that strategy pursued by you when you were there. If we look at Vol. 1, page 106 of the evidence books, this is a-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Vol. 1, page 106, if you look at point 8.1 on the funding model ... you'll see it, half way down:The Group's lending book grew aggressively from €12.9bln in 2001 to €39.2bln in 2007. This growth was largely funded through the wholesale markets. So, can you tell me a bit about that strategy and why you decided to pursue that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Yes, but was it intentional, though, that wholesale funding would increase as it did, aggressively, as it says here in the document but at the same time, funding sourcing from retail deposits would fall? I mean, were you intentionally changing the balance, changing the mix?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: It's not indicative of you de-prioritising retail deposits.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: No, okay. In terms of the risk associated with that increased share from the wholesale market, were you aware of those risks? Were you ... is it something that would be in front of the board on a regular basis about this increase?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: It's is not me.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Sorry. Thank you. Just, staying on this page and just moving down in that paragraph to the sentence, ''The Group's position was highly precarious in 2008 due to its high level of short term funding and therefore its high loan to deposit ratio.'' Do you accept that? That that's why the group found itself in a precarious position in 2008?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. And you accept ... do you accept that that happened because of this change in the mix of funding and this - what it says at the opening of the paragraph - "aggressive" move in the lending, to grow the lending book using the wholesale markets?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. Thank you. Just then, related to that but slightly moving aside, is the stress testing that would have happened then, as you embark on this new strategy or you see the wholesale markets and the potential that they offer. What kind of testing were you doing against this new source of funding in case of a downturn, in case the markets were then closed to you - a particular market...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Who are you referring to, sorry?