Results 901-920 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: In the morning. Do you know of any connection between your ... the press statement that you were working on and the later press statement that Mr. Cardiff says he was working on, which he believes originated ... well a ... on the guarantee that originated with the banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Did you see any other draft?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Do you remember where that might have come from?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Yes. Do you remember what was on that document?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: But, would you not remember, Mr. Beausang, if you were sitting down, and you're working on an e-mail that was sent by the general secretary, would you not remember that you had to have another document beside you, that you were bringing stuff from it into your-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Okay. And you ... did you discuss, subsequently, with Mr. Cardiff, about the two drafts, or forms of guarantee, etc.?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Yes I am sure the night was a night of confusion and pressure but isn't it really bizarre in a way, Mr. Beausang, do you think that, to an ordinary person out there, that we have a document that is mentioned in the bank's minutes, Mr. Cardiff believes he worked on this document, you think you may have had this or another document that you worked on, but nobody can pinpoint where the heck this...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: It must be the most wanted missing document in Irish banking history but we'll have to leave it there for the moment. I just want to move on quickly, Mr. Beausang, to your core evidence page 13. You don't really need to bother looking at it. It is in relation to an institution that is insolvent or approaching insolvency. This document which was referred to earlier, a brief to the domestic...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Mr. Beausang in your diary which as you know for several months in 2008 was a subject of a freedom of information, on 28 May and 21 August, you had a meeting which is entitled "Solvency II COM". What does that refer to?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: The Central Bank is not allowed to make any emergency liquidity assistance to an institution that is insolvent right. So therefore on the night of the guarantee, it would have been absolutely vital for an institution's interest that it was not insolvent if it was to benefit from, would that be fair? I am making a statement but it is a question.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: But then, Mr. Beausang, you had a meeting on 4 September according to your diary with the chief executive officers of the Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks. Three days later on 7 September they told the Financial Regulator that they believed INBS was insolvent. Did they discuss that with you on 4 September?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Yes, no, it's in your diary but you-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Yes. Well, they clearly ... we have, in all the evidence that we've presented and it's been presented ... we don't have time now - for time reasons - but, in a minute of the meeting which the Financial Regulator-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: You're aware of that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: But then you may also be aware that both Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch, and I adduced this evidence this morning with Mr. Cardiff again, in the figures that they gave, on the face of it, showed that INBS was insolvent, its regulatory capital would not cover-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Right. Well, if ... if you like, we can look very quickly, Chairman, at ... oh dear, it's in ... it's actually in your core documents as well, the Merrill Lynch presentation to the NTMA. What the heck page ... that's ... sorry, that's page 168, Mr. Beausang.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Of your document, yes, Vol. 1, your document.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Yes. On the top, right-hand side, "INBS has €11.7 billion of loans ... Writedowns of 30% - 60% results in an impairment of €3.6bn - €7bn", right? And then the Goldman Sachs, which is in another document, it's said that regulatory capital by INBS was €1.8 billion. I mean, that's ... is that insolvency or not?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: You see-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Joe Higgins: Okay.