Results 9,141-9,160 of 40,550 for speaker:Joan Burton

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: -----the-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: -----the proposal was in relation to the level of debt that was going to be put on the shoulders of Irish taxpayers. I would also say to you, Chairman, that we had limited information. In fact, a lot of the information that could be gleaned was picked up not just from the limited parliamentary information that was available but from commentary in terms of economic commentators-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: Sorry, just to be very clear, Deputy-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: -----our concern, just to spell it out to you-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: -----was that the nature of the guarantee was, at that point, indefinable. We didn't know what the extent of it ... except that it was the State taking on an enormous liability which was subsequently quantified as being in the region of €440 billion. And what-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: -----I said-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: -----at the time was quantified as being in the order of €440 billion. If there were refinements of the figure later on, they were later refinements. I'm talking about what information was available. Remember, the guarantee-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: Well-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: Well-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: What the-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: Okay, the alternative that was possible was, for instance, to actually have the banks which were the most exposed, in fact, either fail or be nationalised. Now, when you look at it - and if I go back to that period of time, and you can check this - my concern was, if you like, in relation to two items. First of all, the banks which had caused the difficulty were two, in particular - Anglo...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: The second-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: But I'm explaining my approach. I thought that's what you asked me.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: There were no actual institutions mentioned-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: -----I believe by anybody, including yourselves, in the course of those conclusions.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: And I expressed that-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: -----when I visited the Department of Finance. We were invited in, just before the debate, and I expressed that to the officials in Finance. They actually told me that the Anglo and the Irish Nationwide model were actually very clever models, which I didn't understand.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

Joan Burton: I chose to disagree-----