Results 881-900 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Let me just ask you, many people would say and we related earlier, we had the ECB saying, "You stand behind your banks." What does that mean except that the people have foisted on them the gambling debts of their private financial institutions. So what is that except the bail out of the market by the people. And are they not the same markets, incidentally, that made a bonanza in the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. McCarthy, I'll just quote a paragraph from Nyberg's report, IV. You don't really need to see it on the screen: The Commission [Nyberg's commission] considers that this pervasive pressure for consensus may explain why so many different parties in Ireland simultaneously were willing to adopt specific policies and accepted practices that later proved unsound. At the same time, the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: -----authorities as well, which-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. Now, the ... occasionally hard landing scenarios were mooted, Central Bank and various reports, but was there any time that anything, other than a soft landing, was seriously entertained as a range of ... or, as a possible serious option?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: But that did not move up then to the final views that were dominating policy-making, etc.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: And, Mr. McCarthy, in this remarkable consensus that developed, as Nyberg stated, which included the regulator authorities and Department, indeed, just ask yourself, was the predominance among establishment circles, nationally and internationally, of neoliberal economic ideology, and, as Nyberg put it, "the paradigm of efficient markets" ... was that a big factor in that consensus that was so...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Just to-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Let me just pursue that a little bit further, Mr. McCarthy. In your opening statement you say economists failed "to acknowledge that cataclysmic breakdowns in a market economy were indeed possible" and "in the widespread assumption that the business cycle had been permanently tamed". Now, presumably, going through college, economists learn, for example, some of the basic ideas of Karl Marx,...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: ------particularly the Scandinavian one in the 80s and 90s. Is it remarkable that none of that found its way into the consciousness of the Department, the Central Bank, the regulators, as a huge risk considering the bubble that everybody saw?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Thank you. Mr. Cardiff, at the end of 2008, PricewaterhouseCooper's loan bank analysis of the core banks showed 22 borrowers had total loans of €29.4 billion, and, in 2010, in the total debt of €74 billion taken in by NAMA, 29 borrowers accounted for €38 billion. Can I ask you if the Department of Finance tracked, through 2009, for example, the situation...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Cardiff, just slightly along the same lines, when recapitalisation of the banks became seen to be inevitable by the Department and the system, was there confidence or was there scepticism within the Department on the veracity of the data shown by the banks themselves to allow you to gauge how much recapitalisation would be necessary?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: This is a point, is it that ... I mean, more and more recapitalisation became a factor as a year or two or three went on, so was it the case that the banks didn't give full disclosure at the beginning of the process?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Cardiff, can I turn and revisit, as briefly and as concretely as possible, the issue of the solvency of the Irish Nationwide Building Society on the night of the guarantee? Now, last week we looked at a meeting on 7 September of the regulator and the banks where AIB and Bank of Ireland said, "INBS was insolvent". We don't need to go over that again. But, I wish to look in the evidence...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Just on the face of the figures ... the figures we hope don't lie. Going forward to your own core document, Vol. 2, page 54, Mr. Cardiff, and this is the presentation by Merrill Lynch to the National Treasury Management Agency on 26 September and the top right-hand corner of page 54, "INBS has €11.7 bn of loans ... Writedowns of 30% - 60% results in an impairment of €3.6 bn -...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: But, Mr. Cardiff, on 26 September, on the most benign scenarios put forward by both Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch, INBS, on the face of it, was it not insolvent? And, when you came in front of the public accounts committee, Mr. Cardiff, why was that information in relation to the NTMA presentation redacted? I haven't time to show it on the screen but you will remember, perhaps, it was...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Let me just ask the last question because otherwise I'll be cut off.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: And then this presentation on 26 September was to the NTMA, which wasn't consulted on the night of the guarantee, in relation to the state of INBS and, indeed, Anglo. Was somebody or some bodies working to hide the insolvency of any institution on that night?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Beausang, what time did you get to Government Buildings on the night when the guarantee started ... the process started?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: A few hours before 9 o'clock, or something like that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. Do you remember what time you left Government Buildings?