Results 781-800 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: I want to quote from you ... for you, something from the Irish funds industry marketing brochure from March 2015-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: No, but it's quite simple to-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: So the Irish funds industry organisation says: "We represent the fund promoters/managers, administrators, custodians, transfer agents and professional advisory firms involved in the international funds industry in Ireland, with more than 13,000 funds and net assets of more that €3.8 trillion." Then it goes on to say, "Through its work with governmental and industry committees and...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, can I just move on then Ms Nolan, thank you ... and if you could comment please on the decision to nationalise Anglo Irish Bank. Why that was not taken the night of the guarantee rather than a few months later and what advice the Government received at the time in this regard? And if you could comment if, in your opinion, nationalising Anglo earlier would have sped up a resolution of...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: I appreciate you weren't there on the night, Ms Nolan, but you are a very senior official in finance-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, just to ask you if you might think it's curious that ... I refer to core documents Department of Finance Vol. 2, pages 116 and 119, but I'll quote, it's not necessary to follow it. This is the advice from Merrill Lynch to the National Treasury Management Agency and the Department on 28 September, which is one day before the guarantee. And it is obviously in favour of...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Just to move on to a different but related area, then, Ms. Nolan, on page 5 of your statement, yes, you said, "There was a great reluctance at European level...". We have moved forward to the October-November period of 2010, and approaching the crunch period and the so-called bailout, and you said, "There was a great reluctance at European level to allow the burning of senior...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Ms Nolan, I'd be curious to see how ... how the information ... how it went back and forth between you yourselves and the European Commission and the ECB or whichever of your organisations. So this would be going on at the same time as Mr. Trichet was writing to the Minister for Finance and, you know, demanding certain courses of action. Would that then have been replicated in frequent...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Which of the European institutions was constantly in the ear of your colleagues or, indeed, maybe yourself, in relation to this?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Thank you and then on page 4 ... page 5 in your opening statement again, I'll just quote very briefly. It says:Firstly in October and November 2010 when the guarantee had lapsed and the programme of assistance was being put in place. A number of [the] IMF officials were strongly in favour of burning any unguaranteed and unsecured bonds in Anglo. What do you know about this? What level at...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: So, would this have been seen as a very high level within the IMF? Were you aware of this at the time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, and what authority did they carry within the-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: How did your Department react to this suggestion?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, October-November.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. And can you throw any light then on further on what Mr. Cardiff said in testimony here, Ms Nolan, when he's speaking about pressures from certain quarters that no bondholders would be burned and he said that there was a real damage being done essentially by people operating behind the scenes:[H]idden 'sources' were using leaks of inaccurate information to bounce Ireland into a bailout...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: No.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, thank you. Now, just then on ... in relation to the veto on burning bondholders, can I ask you, Ms Nolan, it's core document Ann Nolan, Vol. 2 and it's page 19. This is a letter from Mr. John Corrigan, the chief executive of the National Treasury Management Agency, to Brian Lenihan, TD, Minister for Finance, dated 28 November 2010. And in the second paragraph, Mr. Corrigan writes:I...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, but could this potentially have changed something if the NTMA had been aware that they may have taken a different approach and convinced the Minster of a different course of action?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (1 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Ms. Nolan, you deal in your statement with the recapitalisation of the banks and the dealing between the banks and the Department. Now, at one stage Bank of Ireland told you that it needed €2 billion. It finished up getting multiples of that. Allied Irish Bank said it didn't need as much support as both Anglo and Bank of Ireland and it finished up getting €21 billion. Were...