Results 601-620 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: And you didn’t like his views either, is that right?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes, it’s recorded that Kelly didn’t believe a word of what you told him. That’s on page 119.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: What about Mr. Murray Brown of the Financial Times, did you have an altercation with him as well?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Could you tell us about your meeting with Mr. Murray Brown or your contacts with him?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes, according to page 221 of the Anglo book by Simon Carswell:Moran gave [Murray Brown] an earful, threatening legal actions against the [Financial Times] if [he] didn’t retract the article. Moran said that Anglo had been in no more difficulty than any other Irish bank. I’m trying to build up that the industry seemed to operate in a consensus that they were right but they...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thanks, there. But, you see, if there were dissenting voices and they were treated in the way in which ... the describing of which is in Mr. Carswell's book, this one ended up costing €64 billion to taxpayers. I don't particularly mind if one company wants to entertain journalists, but this one was so serious. Do you think there was a moral hazard problem in Irish banking?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Moral hazard is when people are exempted from the consequences of their actions. We had to bail out banks; we don't bail out bicycle shops and dry cleaners. So I'm not very worried what bicycle shops and dry cleaners say to stockbrokers. I'm very worried about what happened in this case, that the dissenting voices, there was an attempt made to, I think, to quell them. And we have to as...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Did people in Irish banking think they were too big to fail and they didn't have to address the basic problems but have these discussions with journalist and stockbrokers and commentators instead?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Can I just ask you on the NAMA estimate that there was €9 billion of interest rolled up in loans transferred to it by the five banks and €3 billion related to Anglo? Were you aware of the interest roll-up included in the Anglo loan book?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was that figure included in the board and senior management information dashboard on a regular basis, the rolled-up interest?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Okay. And how was that level of increased risk monitored within the bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: And the meeting of the board of 12 December 2008. Now that's been mentioned this morning, that about two thirds of the board members were absent. But at that board meeting it was reported that David Drumm and Willie McAteer had met with John Hurley and Tony Grimes at the Central Bank of Ireland and a figure of €3 billion of new capital was acknowledged as being needed. Were you...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: What was your assessment of the bank's liquidity and insolvency position on the night of the guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was the gravity of the Anglo position understood? I ask that because the Anglo balance sheet was 60% of Ireland's GDP. Lehman Brothers, which has been mentioned by several speakers, was only 7% of US GDP. I mean, this was Ireland heading towards a real crisis, as we saw. Was that appreciated in the bank and in the people with whom you associated?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: How do you feel in retrospect of having spent time working in Anglo Irish Bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Would you prefer it wasn't on your CV?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Mr. Moran, and thank you, Chairman.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman. Thanks, Mr. Moran. On the CFDs and your discussion with Deputy O'Donnell, Mr. Carswell puts those arising in early 2007, but you weren't told until December. Was there a slowness to react to those purchases by Mr. Quinn?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: There's a suggestion from the Revenue Commissioners in 2006 there should be a stamp duty on CFDs. Would you think it was a good idea if this committee were to recommend that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: But your overall experience with CFDs would not be particularly pleasurable I suppose, would it?