Results 3,981-4,000 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----per investment exposure and 390%-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----when confined with development. Was that a concern for you at the time, or the board, or ... you know, was there a discussion that you can recall?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I don't wish to cut you but my time is brief. The fact that the regulator's guidelines, which we discussed-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----at length earlier, indicated that the concentrations in two related sectors should be 250% maximum.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: It was 390%-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----in September 2008.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Crucial month, we all know.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: And you don't recall whether alarm bells rang in your own head, never mind in other members of the board at that particular juncture?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: It's September 2008.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Well I wish to move on, and refer again now to a document that Deputy Doherty mentioned also. AIB, C3b, Vol. 2, page 29.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Page 29. It's the memo from the Department of Finance-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----from the night of the guarantee.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Where you were, you were marked ... yes, you were marked in attendance.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: And there's a quote, well it's not a quote it's a reference, I suppose more like, at the bottom, close to the bottom of page 29 where Mr. Sheehy, the then chief executive of AIB, is reported to have said, and the quote from this memo is that, "People we've been dealing with for decades, pulling back - 1 month we will be funding bank overnight. Bad if can't even get that, disaster -...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Well was it bankruptcy that was facing the bank on that, on that particular night?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: So you ... do you dispute what's in the attendance note or not?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Thank you for those comments. I want to refer you before I finish, again, to the same document, pages 26 and 27.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Same booklet.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: It's the letter that you issued to the then chairman of Anglo Irish Bank.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Apr 2015)

John Paul Phelan: In ... a few days later, 6 October 2008 where you wrote ... and I'm going to quote directly from the bottom of page 26, "It is frankly outrageous for you to indicate that AIB's liquidity was good for "only a matter of days"." I want you to explain the apparent contradiction between what you're saying there on 8 of ... or sorry, 6 October, and what Mr. Sheehy seems to have expressed on the...