Results 3,521-3,540 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: And are you aware of any other internal applicants?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Can I ... I now want to turn to the period of the crisis itself and the immediate run-up to the crisis in 2008 and your interactions with financial institutions at the time. How do you think that those interactions shaped those institutions' perception of you and of the role that you held? In particular, do you think that you could have led bankers to take decisions that they might not...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Well, we have heard evidence-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----already this morning that sectoral limits were a guideline. You said they were an important guideline. I questioned you as to who they were important for-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----and I'm not sure that I got a particular answer to that question. But do you think that a perception was created within financial institutions, following on from your interactions with them, that would have led them to take commercial decisions subsequent to that perception being established in their mind that maybe they weren't going to be taken to task for breaching things like...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Can I ask you if you think that you have been personally vilified because of the role that you played at the time as chief executive of the Financial Regulator during the collapse?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Can you understand some of the comment made publicly as to, I suppose, the frustration and anger that taxpayers, shareholders, others may have felt that you weren't fulfilling your functions fully?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I want to turn now to, again, a point covered by Deputy Doherty. It's asking you to outline contacts between your office and some of the banking institutions with regard to mergers and takeover options in the period prior to the guarantee. Now, I have a reference, which is Vol. 2, page 89, which is a document I think that cannot be displayed-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----but I'm ... I'm in the Chairman's hand.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Yes, well it is a letter from the chief executive of an institution, which he wrote to you following on from a recommendation from you, it appears from the letter, that that institution should merge with another Irish institution, both of which would be subsequently guaranteed two weeks after this letter was published. And I ... in particular reference here to the answer you gave to Deputy...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: This was a letter that referenced two particular institutions-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----which some would say were ... no, were the most impaired, that they should ... and a recommendation from you to one of their chief executives, that you ... that they should merge. That's the letter I'm talking about. And two weeks later, you ... you admit, under questioning to Deputy Doherty, that, on the night of the guarantee, that nationalisation of Anglo and a guarantee of the rest...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. I want to change now to evidence that we had at the inquiry previously from Mr. Brendan McDonagh, formerly of the National Treasury Management Agency. He gave testimony previously to the inquiry and I want to quote him directly to you. He said "I think what was beginning to happen in September 2008 and, you know, my perception of it now, as opposed ... other people have their own...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: How ... how did it seem? How ... how did that emerge, that thought emerge to you that they weren't happy to have you there?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Yes. I want to ask you now, Mr. Neary, to comment on the solvency protection measures in force and taken before and during the crisis and the stress testing exercises carried out with the financial institutions. Can you comment on those for the inquiry?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Was there any change in the level of stress applied as a result of discussions between the regulator and the Central Bank between the 2006 and 2008 tests?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. I want to refer to board minute-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I want to refer now to a board minute in the second half of 2007. It's in Vol. 1, page 123 of the document. Again, I'm not sure that it's one that can be publicly displayed, but I want to read the quote to you. It's recorded at a board meeting of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority and it is as follows, "the underlying fundamentals of the residential property market appear to...