Results 3,501-3,520 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I suppose, what I ... what I'm touching upon, Mr. Cowen, is the rate. While the IMF rate was fixed, the Commission and the ECB moneys were not fixed. I understand the logic behind it not being too cheap where people would try and access it but the term was short and other conditions were difficult.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: In terms of the role for public interest directors, why did you appoint public interest directors?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Just to finish, in terms of the ... you used the term "talks about talks" prior to the actual bailout. Was it possible not to take the bailout when the talks about talks were known and the IMF were in town?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I ask Mr. Cowen what's the single biggest mistake that was made in the era from '00 to '08?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Top of the screen.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Cowen, you are welcome. Tom Considine, former Secretary General of the Department of Finance, in previous evidence, stated the political pressure to ease up on what was seen as expenditure cuts was very strong. You made a recommendation to the Department, Mr. Cowen, to add an additional €900 million on top of existing costs to the Estimates for the upcoming...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Cowen, the FSR reports, you've addressed them on a number of occasions. You've also stated that there were attachments not just a report. When the reports were presented, were they presented to you or were you just given an executive summary?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: How did you rate them? Did you rate them highly or lowly? What was your view in relation to them?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask you to bring up the FSR reports?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: 2004. If you would allow me, Mr. Cowen, because this is a line of questioning I have used previously in relation to household personal indebtedness. Starting with your period and this is in real time, this isn't subsequent reports from Mr. Honohan or Nyberg or others. The household indebtedness was in the first report itemised as an issue. Subsequently, in '05, '06 and, culminating in the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: But the vast majority is mortgage.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Should you have done more? Should you have intervened further?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Were other tools available to you as the Minister for Finance?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Could you have considered a property tax at that stage to cool the market? On your watch, Mr. Cowen, the State went from, a level of indebtedness, from below the European average to the highest in the OECD.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I understand that. Could you have considered other methods of taxation to cool the market?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask, Mr. Cowen, if you saw the evidence from Mr. Dan McLaughlin when he presented a number of months ago and he made the point that it was, in particular, the commercial real estate sector that did the most damage than any other sector. I mean, there's a lot of conversation about residential mortgages but that Anglo Irish Bank, which would eventually cost the state in the region of...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: At what stage were those large exposures ... were you in finance, or had you left finance by the time it-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: You had left finance. Can I ... final question, Chairman.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Cowen, you said that the liquidity crisis was the reason why the cyclical taxes collapsed. I took that note, that that's what you said.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask you that ... or can I put it to you that other countries had liquidity crises just like ourselves, but our collapse was much more pronounced than everybody else's. Could you explain that to me, please?