Results 3,481-3,500 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The question I'm asking you is-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The question I'm asking you is, should that NTMA model be used in other areas, financial regulation or in the Central Bank, to get the best of the best?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I'm asking you should it be, should it be-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: But would you use it in other crucial sectors?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Okay that's fine, I just wanted to hear your view on that.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Cowen, you're welcome. Mr. Cowen, you've mentioned on numerous occasions today about the PwC analysis that occurred subsequent to the guarantee. That's Project Atlas. Were you aware that the PwC work took the valuations that the banks had and found the result that the banks were solvent based upon the banks' valuations?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Peter Bacon, when he provided evidence before us, said that his figures were that there would be a €35 billion impairment on the banks' balance sheets. Now, the numbers turned out to be €42 billion. Were you surprised at those levels of impairment? Was that the first occasion-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Cowen, you said earlier that the market sentiment had to be addressed prior to the night of the guarantee. And I'm quoting Department of Finance booklet Vol. 2. I'm not sure if that booklet was made available to Mr. Cowen but the, it's the memorandum from Merrill Lynch, it's page 113, dated 28 September 2008. And the second last paragraph, the last line of that and it states, "The...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask, Mr. Cowen, how the authorities ... I'm talking about the Central Bank, the Financial Regulator and the Civil Service also, as well as the body, as well as the Government ... were unaware and yet the market sentiment was very clear and was very clear from a long period of time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask you, Mr. Cowen, if you scroll ... if you turn to the next page of that document please, half way down, last paragraph before summary description. And Merrill Lynch say, "It is clear that certain lowly rated monoline banking models around the world, were there is concentration on a single asset class (such as commercial property) are likely to be unviable as wholesale markets stay...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Even with that statement there from Merrill Lynch?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask your view in relation to INBS attempts to gather deposits in the UK? I'm talking specifically about Michael Fingleton Jr., when he ... people used the term ... "abused" the Government guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Yes. Can I ask, Mr. Cowen, and I understand Cabinet confidentiality may apply here, but your decision to increase the deposit guarantee scheme from €20,000 to €100,000 was higher than a lot of other jurisdictions. Could you give me, and give the committee the analysis that was undertaken to arrive at that decision and who took that analysis on your behalf?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask, Mr. Cowen, that in terms of the amount there was now a €70 billion liability from ... I'm not sure what the liability was at €20,000 per deposit, but was there overkill? Did we all ... did the system or people working the system try to do too much rather than doing enough?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: And similar back to the night of the Guarantee also.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: But, Mr. Cowen ... just, that amount of money was doubled in-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Thanks, Chair, Mr. Cowen. Could I go to core documents DOT/BCO Vol. 5, page 6? Mr. Cowen, in terms of the analysis for NAMA, the expectation was, and Minister Lenihan on the floor of the Dáil said it would be something between a 25% and 30% write-down. When the analysis was concluded it was a lot more than 25% to 30%, it was almost ... I think it was 59% was the average. Did the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: In terms of the ... the final deal, the final arrangement for the bailout, in evidence, Mr. Cardiff stated that the IMF and the officials from our Department of Finance didn't believe it would be successful.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The Department-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Yes, and the IMF ... didn't believe that the bailout on offer would be successful. Why ... were you aware of that?