Results 3,481-3,500 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: How did that ... you gave a couple of examples of outside bodies where some twisting of arms, or other expressions, might have happened or tried to happen, but how did it manifest itself in the operations of the Central Bank itself and in terms of your role as the chief economist?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, thanks.

Written Answers — Department of Health: Alcohol Pricing (9 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: 701. To ask the Minister for Health his plans to introduce a minimum unit pricing on alcohol, as a means to curb alcohol abuse; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [21631/15]

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you, Chairman. Good morning Mr. Neary. I just wanted to ask you a couple of quick questions at the start. Was there any pressure brought to bear on you or on the regulator by the Department of Finance or the domestic standing group to maintain a more favourable view of Irish financial services and the banking sector in particular during your time in the regulator?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: And even in the context of the dual role of promotion of Ireland as destination for financial services or-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Can I turn now to Vol. 2, page 27 of the core documents? And there's a heading there on page 27 at the bottom of the page called "Constructive Ambiguity". I'd like you to explain for the inquiry, what the term "constructive ambiguity" means ... meant, in relation to how it impacted on your role as Financial Regulator.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Can you elaborate more on what you mean by opaque? Like-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: To the entities being regulated or to the-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----public?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I want to put to you a number of quotes from evidence yesterday received from Mr. Horan, who is a former prudential director and head of banking supervision. I want to quote him directly, where he said that he had, "continually pushed the boundaries seeking to make the regulations of banks more intrusive and assertive". Is that how you recall his time in that particular role in the regulator?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Yes, he furthermore went on later in his evidence to state, "the end of 2004, I would have been arguing for the establishment of specialist units to pursue administrative sanctions". Do you recall that? And why, if so, did it not happen?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Further in his evidence, he stated and I quote, "[...] my first week as prudential director, I presented proposals to the authority for capital measures to address high loan-to-value lending ... mortgage lending". Do you remember that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: He then went on to say that in May 2005, he proposed to the authority a corporate governance regime for banks and buildings societies. Do you recall that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: He said it was not accepted, and I'm going to quote him again, Chairman, directly, because, "the view was that the markets ... the institutions were overburdened with regulatory burden at [this] stage".

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, I want to turn than to the evidence that was given by, and it was referenced by Deputy McGrath earlier, Mary Burke yesterday, where she said the following quote:I think people felt undermined by the fact that you would see [a chief executive officer] of a bank in at reception. It was a bank you supervised and you would come to me and say "Do you know why they're in?" and I would go...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Do you have any answer to that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: The clear implication from her evidence yesterday was that they were meeting people above her in the regulator.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: And she was the head of banking-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----that particular section and that she didn't know why they were there.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

John Paul Phelan: And she felt undermined.