Results 3,461-3,480 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: So there are structures is in operation-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: ----- is in existence, that's-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Can we take the break now, seeing that it's coming in a few minutes, and have that discussion?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Well, some similarities perhaps. Mr. O'Connell, can I first ask you, and this, I think, was touched on earlier, if you were regularly taking part in the ... in the monthly board meetings of the Central Bank and financial services authority on recent financial and economic developments, and how rigorous or challenging those particular meetings would have been?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Was it a historical analysis then, kind of, effectively?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Would you have been offered for your own ... asked for your own view directly?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Did you get an opportunity to raise some of the concerns which you have expressed in evidence here at any of those monthly meetings?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: In hindsight, do you think you should have used the opportunity differently at least?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Did you feel that all of the members of the board, for the various years that you would have been coming to those meetings, were sufficiently well prepared or understood the analysis of the reports and the discussions which were taking place? I am not asking you to name any names.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Why do you believe then that they didn't take action if it was that straightforward?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Just dealing with that issue, you mentioned Morgan Kelly's appearance in Kenmare earlier on in answer to some questions. Were you there yourself at that particular-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Would there have been representatives from the Central Bank?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Did they become involved in anything to do with that discussion, can you recall?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. I will change briefly then to the OECD reviews from 2006 and 2008, noting that house prices had overshot their fundamentals. In 2006 they did not rule out a hard landing but predicted that a soft landing was more likely. In both 2006 and 2008 it concluded that the banks were sufficiently well capitalised to be able to absorb any likely shocks. In your opinion, was the OECD's...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: How did they come to the conclusion of soft ... like, I accept what you're saying about their underlying analysis but their final diagnosis-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----was contrasting to it.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: My time is nearly up. One final area that I want to cover ... in your opening statement - and again without naming any names - but you stated that in the Central Bank, this is a direct quote: "In the Central Bank it was difficult to get views through that might impinge on vested interests." I just want you to maybe briefly outline for the inquiry what those vested interests were and how...