Results 3,261-3,280 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: And that's fair enough but the point I'm getting at, we shouldn't ... or should we have been basing our soft landing analysis on the past history of the Irish housing market as that kind of central plank, that we should have been looking outside,? Isn't that the way economics works?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: My time has ended and I don't wish to cut you short but we should ... just simply putting the question to the ... and I'm not blaming you specifically, you were part of a wider team at the time, but we should not have been basing that analysis on the main plank of it being that Irish house prices hadn't fallen in the past.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: No, I'm just asking that question in light of ... I've studied economics for years and past history in any localised situation, we're always warned against using that as the basis of future analysis and development.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: What I am saying-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Chairman. Good afternoon, Mr. Cardiff. Briefly, at the start, I want to ask you about NAMA, and, in particular, the effectiveness of NAMA now, I suppose, with ... in reference to what was envisaged before it was established, and, principally, in relation, if you could, maybe, give the main strength or weakness of NAMA in terms of its effectiveness. I also want to ask you in relation to...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I want to turn now to evidence that you gave last week in relation to minutes from Bank of lreland where they indicated that just two weeks after the guarantee, that they were exploring the issue of taxpayer capital injection. And you responded by saying, "Well, if they knew that two weeks later, then they were "bowsies", because they didn't tell us that." On the night of the guarantee,...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Yes, well I just wanted to put two quotes from the minutes from 13 October and, I think, 17 October, where the first quote from the Court of Bank of Ireland said: "Mr. O'Donovan also reported that he had a signal from a CBI executive who was attending the IMF that Bank of Ireland should approach Government for capital", and in the last paragraph of those minutes it said: "There was however, a...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: That was kind of at odds, or would you agree that that may be at odds with what is contained in these minutes, where they were specifically referencing a State injection?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I want to turn now to your revelation, I suppose, this morning about a tentative approach that you made in 2008 to the IMF about a possible bailout. When in 2008 did it happen? Under whose direction were you seeking or making that particular approach, and was there a response?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: It was on your own initiative, then, pretty much.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: You weren't operating under any direction from-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Then I also want to turn to your comments about communications with Mr. Strauss-Kahn in relation to the burning of bondholders. You say that you received an e-mail from IMF staff members suggesting that he was positive on the matter. Has that e-mail been made public?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Finally, can I ask you, in light of what has transpired since, and in public comment by commentators, politicians, whoever else, do you feel yourself that you have been scapegoated for some of the decisions around the guarantee, the capital injections by the taxpayers into the banks, and the subsequent entrance into a bailout?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Beausang, good afternoon. Firstly, can I just refer to the document ... or the issue that Deputy Higgins referred to in terms of Irish Nationwide and its report ... or the report into it by Goldman Sachs? Mr. Cardiff, in his statement two weeks ago, stated to the committee, "In the first half of September 2008 [and I'm quoting him now], when it was clear that INBS...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. That's fair enough. Mr. Cardiff then went on to outline how the decision to include Nationwide in the guarantee was largely based on this previously mentioned Goldman Sachs report into Nationwide which you have referred to in, I think, paragraph 17.8 of your opening statement. I wanted to ask you, are you aware of ... I suppose you'd call them allegations that were published in a ......

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Did you express those reservations at the time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Were you aware of the evidence that Mr ... Mr. Cardiff gave that third parties, for instance, Davy's, I think he mentioned, and Mr. Desmond and others in the earlier part of 2008 were indicating to the Government that a guarantee was something that should be entered into?