Results 3,201-3,220 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Aynsley, when the new Government entered office, can I ask you: did you feel there was a change of policy towards Anglo Irish Bank or did the previous strategy continue?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask your knowledge of the deleveraging within the other banks, within AIB and Bank of Ireland? Was there not a similar deleveraging with those ... with their assets, that they were forced to sell?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask, Mr. Aynsley, in terms of the further restructuring of the banking sector in Ireland, Anglo Irish turned out not to be systemic, did you feel-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: -----Anglo Irish Bank turned out - IBRC turned out not to be systemic, there was a decision to go down the route of two pillar banks.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Is it the ELA?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Yes. How much was the ELA at its peak to Anglo Irish Bank?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: And then other eligible collateral-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: ------was there, on top of the €40 billion-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Dukes, could I ask you ... you said in your opening statement that the Irish Government and regulation - I assume you're talking about the authorities attached - did not have tools to deal with the crisis that hit? In previous evidence, Governor Honohan came back, he presented to us in the context phase but subsequently clarified that the Governor of the Central Bank did have tools...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Could I ask you your opinion in relation to the tools and the usage of those tools?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Could I-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: You're talking about the special resolution regime.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Okay, but the tools I'm talking about-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Sorry, the tools I'm talking about were, that were available to the Governor of the Central Bank via the previous Acts, the Central Bank Acts, in relation to financial stability. Those tools were available.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Could I just clarify-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: '04.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Can I ... Mr. Dukes, Governor Hurley described the legislation and the tools as "theoretical". Did you hear him make that point?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Okay. Could I ask your view in relation to theoretical powers?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Dukes, you were appointed to the board of Anglo with Mr. Frank Daly, former chairman of the Revenue Commissioners. And how did you find the board or, when you presented, in terms of the previous, the old model, as such, prior to nationalisation?