Results 2,861-2,880 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Briefly, then, in relation to another point that was raised by Senator Barrett, where you spoke about inexperienced developers. I think ... I can't remember what page it was. You said that there clearly was too much debt, too freely available and too many borrowers that led to a glut of inexperienced developers, many of whom traded in a short-term horizon. You've answered what you...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I understand the point you're making, and then this is my last little follow-up on this, but it would take a lot of those operators to have a borrowing of €1.5 billion, such as your firms had from Anglo?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Some of them may have had, but I'm not ... you spoke about the smaller operators specifically, I think, earlier on, and-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Late?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Fair enough, okay. Can I ask ... I've a number of questions that I must put to you. Based on your dealings with the Irish banks in the pre-crisis period, did you get the general impression that maintaining and growing market share was a dominant driver in lending practices? And did you observe increasing competition between them for business with you and your businesses?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Banks were under increasing pressure due to interbank competition to offer incentives such as - and we've mentioned a few of them before - non-recourse loans, interest-only and roll-up ones as well. In your experience, were such practices common among the banks in Ireland? And did the situation differ greatly from practices in banks in other jurisdictions?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Those types of incentives that I mentioned there, non-recourse, interest-only, roll-up, lower interest rate margins, interest holiday periods, those?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. As the profile of your own businesses or business grew, and the size of your portfolio grew, did you observe a relaxation in lending criteria?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. NAMA applied a discount of 5.25% to the long-term value of acquired properties to cover due diligence, which was 0.25% and enforcement at 5%. In your dealings with the Irish banks, how would you rate the extent to which the banks sought robust legal documentation? And was reliance on solicitors' undertakings commonplace or rare?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (23 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you, Chairman. Good afternoon, or good morning, I think, still gentlemen. I only have ten minutes so I'd ask you to be as brief as you can. Firstly ... for you both, briefly, you both subscribed, I think, in your statements to the view that there would have been a soft landing, economically, for the country were it not for economic ... other external economic factors. Do you both...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Mr. Dunne?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: What was the basis of your view that Ireland would have a soft landing? And where were you looking internationally that you felt that in Ireland ... we've heard examples from other witnesses, that the soft landing has almost just been a theoretical thing, that, in practice, hard landings were the order of the day more than soft landings. Where ... where ... what did you base your view on?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Mr. Begg, do you have ... what was the basis of your soft landing theory as well or was it the same?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Yes. Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Well, can I then just maybe turn to the issue of groupthink, which was mentioned in several of the reports that have been referenced already. I'm being Devil's advocate slightly, Chairman - I'm sure that you'll correct me if I'm wrong - but for those who might look from the outside at your evidence today, you were two key players at different times in the social partnership process....

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Mr. Begg, do you?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, well, that is fair enough. Can I ask you then in respect to your roles on the different boards that we're referring to here, that you were members of, do either of you have ... feel any sense of either collective or individual responsibility for the, what could be termed at least, abject failure in regulation that took place in the banking sector? And not just in terms of the...