Results 2,741-2,760 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. And then, also, subsequently, in terms of your appointment as chairman of the bank, how did that ... how did that happen?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Do you have any views as to ... if you had your time back again ... the initial conversation with Minister Lenihan ... or the decision to-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Thank you both.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Always quick, Chairman. Briefly, Mr. Dukes, who told you from European level that Anglo had to be wound up as quickly as possible? Who was that conversation with, can you recall?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Outside of the ... your encounter with Minister Lenihan in Leinster House when you were asked initially to becoming a public interest director, were you giving any ... given any instructions or direction or riding orders as to what your role would be?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: It was never really explained?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Simple-minded, I ... I ... I think others would dispute that assessment. Mr. Aynsley, Senator D'Arcy asked earlier - and I think Mr. Dukes answered - in relation to NAMA, had it done a good job. I don't recall if you had answered that question. If you did, feel free to say you did. But what's your view on NAMA, briefly?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Finally, do you think that your remuneration package, such as it was, which was significantly ahead of the cap that was proposed by the Government ... that it was a cause of the souring, or potentially partly at least, a cause of the souring of relations between the Department of Finance and management in Anglo?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you, Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Merriman.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Firstly, I want to reference a document that Senator D'Arcy just spoke about earlier, Vol. 1, page 126, minutes of a board meeting, 22 July 2005. The heading at the top is, "Section 3: Key Business Drivers Behind the Plan" and, specifically, the fourth point there, which is as follows, "Tracker mortgages will account for an increasing proportion of business - rising from 5% today to 60% by...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: It isn't my one anyway.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: In relation to that, were you yourself aware of the risks that, you know, the tracker mortgage rate could pose for the institution? And, actually, as a board member, was it ever discussed really in-depth at board level in the EBS?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: They should have been paying the premium. Yes, okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: And did you raise that? Did you-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: But you're saying there was a discussion but perhaps not as in-depth as there-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, okay. I want to reference your opening statement. I think it's the seventh page but it's numbered as No. 9. The first paragraph ... the bottom of the first paragraph where you say, and I quote, "All understood the necessity for EBS to expand it's business and improve profitability. I would go as far to say we were encouraged to expand and become more commercial." In fact, at the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, that's fair enough. I want refer to core document 2 ... Vol. 2, sorry, page 37, which is a letter from the Financial Regulator to Mr. Murphy, managing director, on 3 March 2008. It should be up on the screen, I'd say, momentarily. It says "Copy to Emer, Brian, Fidelma, Alan [who, I presume, is yourself] [and] Grant." It's a result of an inspection process. There's an interesting...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Jul 2015)

John Paul Phelan: "Overall indebtedness was assessed on the basis of an uncertified Net Worth Statement. The inspectors would question whether reliance should be placed on such a statement." Over the page, page 44, second box, point No. 3, "The purpose of the €4m loan changed after approval - it is not clear to inspectors how the €3m funds advanced will be utilised (€1m being used to...